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THE CONSTITUTIONALITY OF COVENANT
MARRIAGE LAWS
Melissa Lawton*
INTRODUCTION
Reducing the divorce rate has become a priority in America.1 Re-
searchers contend that divorce causes a myriad of social ills, particu-
larly those suffered by children of divorced parents.2 Some assert that
no-fault divorce laws are the major reason for the increase in divorce
during recent decades.' No-fault divorce is available in nearly every
state.4 Several states have considered passing covenant marriage laws
to reduce the divorce rate.5 Last summer, Louisiana became the first
state to implement covenant marriages when the state legislature en-
* I would like to thank Professor James Fleming for his encouragement and in-
sight while I wrote this Note.
1. See Editorial, The Divorce Debate, N.Y. Times, Feb. 15, 1996, at A26 (report-
ing on a "new movement" to toughen state divorce laws); Dirk Johnson, Attacking
No-Fault Notion, Conservatives Try to Put Blame Back in Divorce, N.Y. Times, Feb.
12, 1996, at A10 (citing several state efforts to reduce the number of divorces).
2. Linda Bird Francke, Growing Up Divorced 152-53 (1983) (listing several
problems of children whose parents are divorced, such as feelings of anger, sadness,
shame, and insecurity, alcohol and drug use, and general aggressive behavior); see
also David Blankenhorn, Fatherless America 44 (1995) (reporting that divorce in-
creases child poverty); Barbara Dafoe Whitehead, Dan Quayle Was Right, Atlantic
Monthly, Apr. 1993, at 47 (citing a 1988 survey which found that children of one-
parent families, which included out-of-wedlock children and children of divorce, are
more likely than children in two-parent families to drop out of high school, become
pregnant as teenagers, or have trouble with the law).
3. See Lenore J. Weitzman, The Divorce Revolution xwiii (1985) (linking the in-
crease in the divorce rate with no-fault divorce laws); Elizabeth S. Scott, Rational
Decisionmaking About Marriage and Divorce, 76 Va. L. Rev. 9, 9-10 (1990) (noting
that the change from "fault" to "breakdown" grounds for divorce has resulted in high
divorce rates). *
4. See Herma Hill Kay, Equality and Difference: A Perspective on No-Fault Di-
vorce and its Aftermath, 56 U. Cin. L. Rev. 1, 5-6 (1987) (listing every state's version
of no-fault divorce); see also Stephen D. Sugarman, Introduction to Divorce Reform
at the Crossroads 1, 2 (Herma Hill Kay & Stephen D. Sugarman eds., 1990) (stating
that although "[slome lament the shift to no-fault divorce ... talk of reregulating
divorce is virtually absent from the current discourse about reform").
5. Eighteen states have introduced covenant marriage laws: Alabama, Arizona,
California, Georgia, Indiana, Kansas, Louisiana, Minnesota, Mississippi, Missouri,
Nebraska, Ohio, Oklahoma, South Carolina, Tennessee, Virginia, Washington, and
West Virginia. See S. 606, Reg. Sess. (Ala. 1998); H. 2658, 43rd Leg., 2d Reg. Sess.
(Ariz. 1998); S. 1377, Reg. Sess. (Cal. 1997); H. 249, 144th Gen. Ass., Reg. Sess. (Ga.
1997); H. 1052, 110th Gen. Ass., 2d Reg. Sess. (Ind. 1998); H. 2839, 77th Leg., Reg.
Sess. (Kan. 1998); H. 756, Reg. Sess. (1997 La.); S. 2935,80th Reg. Sess. (Minn. 1998);
H. 1645, Reg. Sess. (Miss. 1998); H. 1864, 89th Gen. Ass., 2d Reg. Sess. (Mo. 1998);
L.H. 1214, 95th Leg., 2d Reg. Sess. (Neb. 1998); H. 567, 122nd Gen. Ass., Reg. Sess.
(Ohio 1997); H. 2208, 46th Leg., 2d Sess. (Okla. 1998); S. 961. Gen. Ass., 112th Reg.
Sess. (S.C. 1998); H. 2101, 100th Gen. Ass. (Tenn. 1998); H. 1056, Reg. Sess. (Va.
1998); S. 6135, 55th Leg. (Wash. 1998); H. 4562. 73rd Leg., 2d Reg. Sess. (W. Va.
1998).
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acted House Bill 756, otherwise known as the Covenant Marriage
Act.6 This Act gives those planning to marry in Louisiana a choice
between two options: a standard marriage or a covenant marriage.7
A covenant marriage differs from the standard marriage in several
ways. Most fundamentally, those choosing a covenant marriage must
receive counseling prior to the wedding,' must agree to pursue addi-
tional counseling if the marriage encounters difficulty,9 and cannot ob-
tain a no-fault divorce absent a lengthy separation.' 0
Activity in both statehouses 1 and op-ed pages reflect the increasing
societal interest in covenant marriage.12 Many are uncomfortable
with or angered by such legislation. 3 This Note addresses whether
opponents of covenant marriage have a viable legal challenge to the
constitutionality of such legislation and, furthermore, whether sound
policy arguments counsel against the legislation.
Part I examines the language of Louisiana's covenant marriage law,
outlining the obligations required to enter into a covenant marriage.
It compares the two marriage choices in Louisiana, underscoring what
distinguishes covenant marriages from standard marriages. Part I also
compares covenant marriage's divorce requirements to an existing
fault divorce system.
Part II examines the constitutional right to marry, including the
Supreme Court's recognition of it as a fundamental right and the
Court's treatment of regulations restricting the right to marry. This
part defines the right to marry and analyzes the various constitutional
bases underlying this right. By analyzing Planned Parenthood v.
Casey, 4 this part also discusses the appropriate level of judicial scru-
tiny for infringements on the right to marry.
Having concluded that Casey's undue burden standard is proper for
judicial review of the right to marry, part III applies that standard to
Louisiana's covenant marriage law. Through a hypothetical challenge
to the law, part III determines that Louisiana's covenant marriage law
is not an undue burden on the right to marry and is, therefore, consti-
tutional. This part then outlines the policy debate over Louisiana's
covenant marriage law. It analyzes published articles written on the
6. La. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 9:272 (West Supp. 1998).
7. Id. §§ 9:272, 9:273.
8. Id. § 9:273(A)(2)(a).
9. Id.
10. Id. § 9:307.
11. See supra note 5 for examples of statehouse activity on covenant marriage.
12. See Amitai Etzioni, Marriage With No Easy Outs, N.Y. Times, Aug. 13, 1997,
at A23; Walter Kirn, The Ties That Bind, Time, Aug. 18, 1997, at 48; Katha Pollitt,
What's Right About Divorce, N.Y. Times, June 27, 1997, at A29; Abigail Trafford,
Getting Tough on Divorce is Not the Same as Getting Real, Wash. Post, Aug. 26, 1997,
at Z6.
13. See infra Part III.B.1-2 (detailing how some liberals and feminists have criti-
cized the law).
14. 505 U.S. 833 (1992).
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subject of covenant marriage laws and, for the purposes of discussion,
analogizes expressed opinions of different political groups to illustrate
those groups' likely positions on covenant marriage laws' propriety
and effectiveness. It concludes by recognizing that covenant marriage
laws, though constitutional, may be unsound or unwise for compelling
policy reasons.
I. LOUISIANA'S COVENANT MARRIAGE LAW
This part first analyzes the different sections of Louisiana's cove-
nant marriage law and compares these sections to Louisiana's stan-
dard marriage. It distinguishes covenant marriage divorce
requirements from New York's current fault divorce system. Finally,
this part reviews some criticisms of the law's divorce options.
A. Statutory Components
Louisiana Revised Statute § 9:272 defines a covenant marriage as
one "entered into by one male and one female who understand and
agree that the marriage between them is a lifelong relationship."'t5
The statute emphasizes the importance of preserving covenant mar-
riages by providing for dissolution only where "there has been a com-
plete and total breach of the marital covenant commitment."' 6 There
are four key components to a covenant marriage: (1) the couple must
declare their intent to enter a covenant marriage;17 (2) counseling is
required before the marriage takes place;"' (3) the couple's marriage
certificate wvill indicate that their marriage is a covenant marriage;' 9
and (4) there are special requirements to terminate the covenant mar-
riage.' This section will review those requirements in turn.
1. The Declaration
Section 9:273 outlines how a couple must declare their intent to
enter a covenant marriage.2 Each member of the couple is required
to recite a declaration professing their belief that marriage is a cove-
nant "between a man and a woman who agree to live together as hus-
15. La. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 9:272 (West Supp. 1998).
16. Id.
17. I. § 9:273(A)(1).
18. Id. § 9:273(A)(2)(a), (b).
19. Id. § 9:245(A)(1). A marriage certificate is "the record prepared for every
marriage on a form approved by the state registrar of vital records." i.
20. Id. § 9:307.
21. Id. § 9:273. Section 9:275 also gives the option to already married couples to
designate their marriage as a covenant marriage. Id. § 9:275. Such a couple swears to
pursue counseling if marital trouble arises and is obligated to undergo counseling
prior to designating their union as a covenant marriage. Id. § 9:275(C).
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band and wife for so long as they both may live."'22 Couples must also
assert that they have selected each other carefully and conveyed to
one another everything that could discourage the decision to enter
into marriage.' Both promise to make efforts to preserve their mar-
riage, including marital counseling if the couple encounters marital
problems.24
2. The Required Pre-Marital Counseling
Sections 9:273(A)(2)(a) and (b) sketch what counseling is required
prior to a covenant marriage.' The couple must present an affidavit
from a clergyman of any religious sect or from a marriage counselor
swearing that they have received counseling prior to the marriage.26
The counseling must include "a discussion of the seriousness of cove-
nant marriage, communication of the fact that a covenant marriage is
a commitment for life, a discussion of the obligation to seek marital
counseling in times of marital difficulties, and a discussion of the ex-
clusive grounds for legally terminating a covenant marriage by di-
vorce."27 The counselor must attest that the parties were counseled
on the above and must acknowledge that he or she gave them a stan-
dard informational pamphlet prepared by the Louisiana Attorney
General.28
3. The Special Means of Terminating a Covenant Marriage
In addition to the hurdles one must pass to enter a covenant mar-
riage, the law also has special divorce requirements. Section 9:307
lists the grounds for divorce in a covenant marriage.2 9 A spouse may
obtain a judgment of divorce only upon proof of one of the following:
(1) the other spouse has committed adultery;30 (2) the other spouse
has committed a felony and has been sentenced to death or imprison-
ment; 31 (3) the other spouse has abandoned the matrimonial domicile
for a period of one year and has constantly refused to return;32 (4) the
other spouse has physically or sexually abused the spouse seeking the
22. Id. § 9:273(A)(1). The couple makes the declaration upon application for the
marriage license, and the declaration is filed with the official who issues the marriage
license. Id. § 9:272(B).
23. Id. § 9:273(A)(1). The statute does not provide information regarding what
these disclosures might be.
24. Id.
25. Id. § 9:273(A)(2)(a), (b).
26. Id. § 9:273(A)(2)(a).
27. Id.
28. Id. § 9:273(A)(2)(b). The pamphlet prepared by the Attorney General "pro-
vides a full explanation of the terms and conditions of a covenant marriage." Id.
29. Id. § 9:307.
30. Id. § 9:307(A)(1).
31. Id. § 9:307(A)(2).
32. Id. § 9:307(A)(3).
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divorce or a child of one of the spouses;33 (5) the spouses have been
living apart continuously without reconciliation for two years, if there
is no separation judgment? 4 If a separation judgment is obtained, the
parties can procure a divorce after one year of separation if there are
no minor children of the marriage 35 and one year and six months of
separation if there are minor children. 6 Separation judgments can be
obtained for the same fault-based reasons as the divorce, as well as for
the "habitual intemperance of the other spouse, or excesses, cruel
treatment, or outrages" if such behavior is "of such a nature as to
render their living together insupportable."31
B. Comparing Louisiana's Covenant Marriage to a
Standard Marriage
There are fewer and less complicated steps to take when entering
into a standard marriage in Louisiana than when entering into a cove-
nant marriage. 8 For example, a standard marriage requires neither a
declaration regarding the understanding of marriage nor attestations
that the parties have disclosed personal facts to each other.39 There is
no counseling requirement either before or during the standard mar-
riage.' The most marked difference, however, between the two mar-
riage forms, is the requirements for a divorce. A divorce shall be
granted in a standard marriage when any of the following take place:
(1) the motion of a spouse, once either spouse has filed for divorce,
upon proving that the spouses have lived separate and apart continu-
ously for 180 days;4' (2) the non-petitioning spouse has committed
adultery;4 2 or (3) the non-petitioning spouse has committed a felony
and has been sentenced to death or imprisonment.43 In Louisiana,
both a standard marriage and a covenant marriage may be dissolved
immediately in cases of adultery or the felony imprisonment of the
non-petitioning spouse." There are other fault-based grounds for di-
33. Id. § 9:307(A)(4).
34. Id. § 9:307(A)(5). A separation judgment is a court order on the disputed is-
sues of the separation. See James T. Friedman, The Divorce Handbook: Your Basic
Guide to Divorce 165 (1984).
35. Id. § 9:307(A)(6)(a).
36. Id. § 9:307(A)(6)(b).
37. Id. § 9:307(B)(6).
38. Compare La. Civ. Code Ann. arts. 87 (West 1993) (requiring a marriage cere-
mony, the absence of legal impediment, and the free consent of the parties to get
married), with La. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 9:273 (requiring a declaration of intent and proof
of marital counseling to get a covenant marriage).
39. See La. Civ. Code. Ann. art. 87.
40. See id-
41. La. Civ. Code Ann. art. 102 (West Supp. 1998).
42. Id. art. 103(2).
43. Id. art. 103(3).
44. Id.; La. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 9:307(A)(1)-(2) (West Supp. 1998).
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vorce in a covenant marriage: abandonment 45 and physical or sexual
abuse.46 Because the pre-divorce separation periods are much longer
for a covenant marriage, a no-fault divorce is more readily attained by
those in a standard marriage in Louisiana.47
It is worthwhile to compare Louisiana's covenant marriage, with its
lengthy waiting periods for a no-fault divorce, and New York's divorce
laws, which technically do not offer a no-fault divorce option48 and do
not offer a choice among types of marriage and divorce.49 In New
York, a petitioning spouse may obtain a divorce based on the follow-
ing grounds: (1) cruel and inhuman treatment by the non-petitioning
spouse such that the conduct "so endangers the physical or mental
well being of the plaintiff as renders it unsafe or improper for the
plaintiff to cohabit with the defendant";5" (2) the abandonment of the
petitioning spouse for at least one year;51 (3) the imprisonment of the
non-petitioning spouse for at least three years, as long as the impris-
onment began after the marriage;52 or (4) the adultery of the non-
petitioning spouse.53 To obtain a divorce based on the separation of
the spouses, they must live apart pursuant to a separation judgment5 4
or a written agreement for at least one year.5 5
New York's divorce alternatives are broader than Louisiana's cove-
nant marriage divorce options. First, New York provides for an imme-
diate end to the marriage in cases of mental cruelty,5 6 while
Louisiana's covenant marriage law does not.57 In addition, with a cov-
enant marriage, the parties may have to be separated for two years
before obtaining a divorce if they cannot reach a settlement agree-
ment. 8 Even in comparison with New York's fault based regime, cov-
enant marriage's divorce requirements are strict.
45. La. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 9:307(A)(3) (defining abandonment as leaving the matri-
monial domicile for a period of one year and constantly refusing to return).
46. Id. § 9:307(A)(4).
47. Id. § 9:307(A)(5), (6).
48. See N.Y. Dom. Rel. Law § 170 (McKinney 1988). The only way to obtain a
no-fault divorce in New York is if both parties consent. Sugarman, supra note 4, at 2.
49. See N.Y. Dom. Rel. Law art. 3 (McKinney 1988).
50. Id. § 170(1).
51. Id. § 170(2).
52. Id. § 170(3).
53. Id. § 170(4).
54. Id. § 170(5). See supra note 34 for a definition of a separation judgment.
55. N.Y. Dom. Rel. Law § 170(6).
56. See id. § 170(1).
57. See La. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 9:307 (West Supp. 1998).
58. Id. § 9:307(B)(5). By agreeing on settlement terms, a couple with children can
get a no-fault divorce in a year and a half; without children, in one year. Id.
§ 9:307(A)(6)(a), (b). Under Louisiana's standard divorce options, a couple can get
divorced after a six-month separation. La. Civ. Code Ann. art. 103(1) (West Supp.
1998).
[Vol. 662476
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C. Ambiguities and Weaknesses of the Law
Louisiana's covenant marriage law does not comprehensively out-
line the provisions that distinguish it from standard marriage.5" It is
clear, however, that only the "innocent" partner can file for divorce
on the fault grounds to obtain an immediate end to a covenant mar-
riage.' Where a couple meets the separation requirements, it is un-
clear whether any separation that makes a couple eligible for divorce
must be mutually agreed upon to dissolve the covenant marriage.61 In
addition, the statute does not make clear whether the promise to seek
counseling applies when marital troubles arise due to abuse, abandon-
ment, or imprisonment.62 At least one commentator has assumed
that, if any of the fault-based grounds for divorce occur, then the
counseling requirement falls out.63 This reading of the statute is com-
pelling because once one spouse commits an act that qualifies the non-
offending spouse for an immediate divorce-particularly physical or
sexual abuse-it seems unreasonable to delay divorce proceedings so
that the parties can receive marital counseling. The statute, however,
does not explicitly allow for this exemption from counseling.'
In addition to the uncertainty regarding when counseling is re-
quired, the statute does not clearly set forth the amount and type of
counseling required either prior to or during the marriage, except that
it requires the parties and a counselor discuss the sanctity of a cove-
nant marriage and the steps that must be taken to dissolve one.65 It is
also unclear whether the counseling requirement would be waived if a
couple cannot afford marriage counseling."
A frequent criticism of Louisiana's law is that the drafters ignored
important familial issues. For example, those in a covenant marriage
59. See La. Rev. Stat. Ann. §§ 9:273(A), 9:307.
60. See id § 9:307(A).
61. See id. If the separation must be mutually agreed upon, then the spouse seek-
ig a divorce who cannot get the other spouse to agree to the separation would be
precluded from obtaining a divorce absent fault grounds.
62. See id § 9:273(A)(1).
63. See Joanna Weiss, Covenant Marriage Has No Takers on Its First Day, Times-
Picayune (New Orleans), Aug. 16, 1997, at Al.
64. La. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 9:273(A)(1).
65. ld. § 9:273(A)(2)(a); see John Shalett, Letter to the Editor, License Marriage
Counselors, Times-Picayune (New Orleans), Aug. 16, 1997, at B6. Shalett, President
of the Louisiana Association for Marriage and Family Therapy, expressed "grave con-
cern" that the covenant marriage bill provides "no definition of who marriage coun-
selors are" nor "what their qualifications should be." Id.
66. Hypothetically, a religious couple could always visit a clergyperson for free
counseling. This, however, prompts an additional criticism that clergy are not ade-
quately trained to provide counseling that effectively addresses marital problems. See
Zinie Chen, Couples Get Help in Building Successfid Relationships, Associated Press
Pol. Serv., Nov. 16, 1997, available in 1997 WL 2563082 (stating that typically minis-
ters are unqualified to provide couples with the training they need for a successful
marriage).
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have limited grounds for a fault-based divorce.67 Critics question
whether it is reasonable to deny an immediate divorce if the fault al-
leged is, for example, extreme emotional abuse, threatening behavior,
confinement, or the withholding of financial support 8.6  Furthermore,
the law does not provide guidance on child custody or support issues
that will inevitably arise during the mandated long-term separation.69
If a couple is amicable enough to reach a settlement agreement, a no-
fault divorce can be obtained in one year, absent minor children.70 If,
however, the relationship is contentious, the couple will be unlikely to
reach a settlement agreement and cannot obtain a divorce for two
years.71 This is a lengthy period of time for important issues such as
support and custody to remain unresolved. While other states do not
assist couples in determining these matters, no other fault system has
such a lengthy separation period.72
Some questions remain as to the drafters' thoroughness and as to
how the covenant marriage law should be interpreted. Any criticism
that the drafters should have added other grounds for divorce may be
addressed through amendments, and any ambiguities involving the
law's requirements may be resolved through future interpretation.
For those who attack the law's constitutionality, however, the problem
is not so easily resolved. The next part provides background analysis
on the right to marry to evaluate the strength of arguments against
covenant marriage.
II. THE CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHT TO MARRY
The Constitution does not explicitly protect the right to marry. The
Bill of Rights lists individual rights that the Constitution guarantees,73
while other rights are implicit in the text and afforded similar constitu-
67. See La. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 9:307(A)(1)-(3).
68. See Ashton Applewhite, Would Louisiana's "Covenant Marriage" Be a Good
Idea for America?: No, Insight, Oct. 6-13, 1997, at 25 ("Who really believes that phys-
ical abuse or abandonment must take place to render a marriage intolerable? Cer-
tainly no victim of mental cruelty, verbal abuse, confinement, financial or sexual
withholding, threats against children or dozens of other reprehensible behaviors
against which covenant marriage will offer no recourse."); Pollitt, supra note 12 (stat-
ing that "[y]ou don't have to be abused or betrayed to have a bad marriage").
69. See La. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 9:307.
70. Id. § 9:307(A)(6)(b).
71. Id. § 9:307(A)(5).
72. See, e.g., N.Y. Dom. Rel. Law § 170 (McKinney 1988) (providing for divorce in
one year if the parties agree on the terms of their separation).
73. See, e.g., U.S. Const. amend. I (including protection of the right to the free
exercise of religion and the right to free speech).
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tional protection.74 The Supreme Court has recognized the right to
marry as one among many such unenumerated rights.75
Whether a right is constitutionally protected or not determines the
level of scrutiny76 with which the Court reviews legislation affecting
that right. Over the years, the Supreme Court has developed three
different levels of judicial scrutiny used when assessing a law's consti-
tutionality.77 The Court applies strict scrutiny, the highest standard of
review, to statutes that infringe on a fundamental fight or rest upon a
suspect classification.78 To survive strict scrutiny, the government
must demonstrate that the statute furthers a compelling governmental
interest and that the statute is narrowly tailored to achieve that inter-
est.79 The Court has also developed an intermediate level of scru-
tiny. 0 The Court employs intermediate scrutiny for statutes that
discriminate on the basis of sex,8' statutes that burden the rights of
illegitimate children,' 2 and infringements on commercial speech.' To
survive intermediate scrutiny, the state action taken must "serve im-
portant governmental objectives and must be substantially related to
achievement of those objectives."'  The lowest tier of review, or def-
erential scrutiny, demands only that the legislation bear "some ra-
tional relationship to legitimate state purposes" for the statute to
stand, and applies to statutes that do not infringe on any recognized
74. See San Antonio Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1, 33-34 (1973) (rec-
ognizing that rights can be explicitly or implicitly guaranteed by the Constitution); see
also Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U.S. 618 (1969) (recognizing implicit the right to
travel); Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S. 533 (1964) (recognizing implicit the right to vote).
75. See Zablocki v. Redhail, 434 U.S. 374, 386 (1978) (reaffirming the right to
marry); Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1, 12 (1967) (stating that the right to marry "has
long been recognized as one of the vital personal rights").
76. Jeffrey M. Shaman, Cracks in the Structure: The Coming Breakdown of the
Levels of Scrutiny, 45 Ohio St. LJ. 161, 161 (1984) (defining levels of scrutiny as levels
of judicial review).
77. See, eg., Certain Named and Unnamed Non-Citizen Children and their Par-
ents v. Texas, 448 U.S. 1327, 1329-30 (1980) (describing the three levels of scrutiny);
see Leading Cases, 106 Harv. L. Rev. 163, 211 (1992) (stating that "[iln an effort to
avoid endorsing the untrammeled exercise of judicial power," the Court applies vary-
ing levels of scrutiny to government actions that restrict fundamental rights).
78. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. at 28; see infra notes 97-104 and accompanying text (pro-
viding definitions of "fundamental right" and "suspect classification").
79. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. at 28.
80. See Craig v. Boren, 429 U.S. 190, 197 (1976).
81. Id. (applying intermediate scrutiny to an Oklahoma law that allowed women
to drink alcohol at age 18 while men could not drink alcohol until age 21).
82. See, e.g., Mills v. Habluetzel, 456 U.S. 91, 99 (1982) (applying intermediate
scrutiny to a statute that allowed illegitimate children to bring proceedings to estab-
lish their paternity only one year after their birth).
83. See, eg., Florida Bar v. Went for It, Inc., 515 U.S. 618, 623-24 (1995) (applying
intermediate scrutiny to Florida Bar rules which forbade attorneys from mailing solic-
itations to potential clients within thirty days of any accident).
84. Craig, 429 U.S. at 197.
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constitutional right or draw upon a suspect classification."5 The Court,
however, has not strictly adhered to this three-tiered approach for re-
viewing statutes and often mixes elements from the various scrutiny
levels to make the standards more or less difficult to pass. 6 In a re-
cent case, Planned Parenthood v. Casey,87 the Court declined to use
any of the three traditional levels of scrutiny to review legislation and,
instead, applied an undue burden test. This test balances the depth of
the infringement against the state interest at issue. Consequently,
how fundamental the Court views the right involved determines the
depth of protection it grants and, hence, the extent and nature of reg-
ulation a legislature can impose.88
Although the Supreme Court has traditionally protected the right to
marry, it is unclear exactly what conduct the right to marry protects.
Individuals do have the right to marry without arbitrary restrictions. 9
In addition, people have the right to get married to a partner of the
opposite sex 90 without regard to race.91 It also includes the right to
marry while incarcerated. 2 Although the Supreme Court has never
recognized a right to divorce, one Supreme Court Justice has argued
that the right to marry includes the right to divorce, 93 because the two
85. San Antonio Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1, 40, 44 (1973) (applying
deferential scrutiny to a Texas school funding provision after concluding that wealth
was not a suspect classification and education was not a fundamental right).
86. See, e.g., Plyler v. Doe, 457 U.S. 202, 217-18 (1982) (requiring that a statute
denying education to children of undocumented aliens further a "substantial" state
goal--rather than deferential scrutiny's legitimate state goal-even though education
is not a fundamental right and alienage is not a suspect class). See also Shaman, supra
note 76, at 165-72 (explaining how the Court has departed from the three-tier scrutiny
levels depending on the right involved). Compare Gerald Gunther, Forward: In
Search of Evolving Doctrine on a Changing Court, 86 Harv. L. Rev. 1, 20-24 (1972)
(describing the scrutiny level later employed in such a case as Plyler as a "rational
basis test with bite"), with Kadrmas v. Dickinson Pub. Sch., 487 U.S. 450, 459 (1988)
(construing Plyler as applying a heightened level of scrutiny).
87. 505 U.S. 833, 874 (1992).
88. Id. at 874-75.
89. See Zablocki v. Redhail, 434 U.S. 374, 389 (1978) (overturning a law denying
marriage licenses to parents who owed child support, in part because the infringement
on the right to marry did not further the state interest in child support being paid).
90. See Defense of Marriage Act, Pub. L. 104-199, § 3, 110 Stat. 2419 (1996) (codi-
fied at 28 U.S.C. § 173C (1996) and 1 U.S.C. § 7 (1996)). The Act defined marriage as
between two people of the opposite sex in response to the Hawaii case of Baehr v.
Lewin, 852 P.2d 44 (Haw. 1993), which held that, under the Hawaii state constitution,
denying homosexuals the right to marry was gender-based discrimination subject to
strict scrutiny and unconstitutional on its face. Id. at 59-67. The Act also granted
states the right to withhold full faith and credit to other state laws that grant the right
to marry to homosexuals. Defense of Marriage Act § 2.
91. Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1, 2 (1967) (striking down a Virginia anti-miscege-
nation law).
92. Turner v. Safley, 482 U.S. 78, 95 (1987) (overturning a prison regulation that
denied inmate marriages unless the superintendent found compelling reasons to grant
permission).
93. Sosna v. Iowa, 419 U.S. 393, 419-20 (1975) (Marshall, J., dissenting) (asserting
a right to obtain a divorce because it is so "closely related to the right to marry"); see
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"both involve the voluntary adjustment of the same fundamental
human relationship."94 Additionally, several commentators believe
that the right to divorce naturally follows from the right to marry.95
This part will explore the constitutional sources for the right to
marry. It will first discuss how the Court protects the right to marry
through the Fourteenth Amendment's Equal Protection and Due Pro-
cess Clauses, including how the right to marry is related to the right to
intimate association and the right to privacy. Part II.B will then ana-
lyze the proper level of scrutiny courts should use to review statutes
restricting the right to marry.
A. Constitutional Bases for the Right to Marry
Covenant marriage laws implicate the constitutional right to marry.
The Supreme Court has grounded the right to marry in the constitu-
tional sources discussed in this section.
1. Constitutional Protection for the Right to Marry and the
Fourteenth Amendment
The right to marry is grounded in the Fourteenth Amendment,
which, according to the Supreme Court, protects certain unenumer-
ated rights.96 The Court's leading formulations for deciding whether
an asserted right is fundamental and, thus, constitutionally protected
by the Due Process Clause, is the language of Justice Cardozo in
Palko v. Connecticut97 and Justice Powell in Moore v. City of East
Cleveland.98 In Palko, fundamental rights were defined as those rights
that are "of the very essence of a scheme of ordered liberty"' , such
that "neither liberty nor justice would exist if they were sacrificed."'"
Moore defined fundamental rights as those "deeply rooted in this Na-
Laura Bradford, Note, The Counterrevolution: A Critique of Recent Proposals to Re-
form No-Fault Divorce Laws, 49 Stan. L. Rev. 607, 622-26 (1997) (acknowledging that
the Supreme Court has never recognized the right to divorce, but asserting that
changing social norms may prompt the Court to recognize this right in the future).
94. Sosna, 419 U.S. at 420 (Marshall, J., dissenting) (citing Boddie v. Connecticut,
401 U.S. 371, 383 (1971)). Boddie v. Connecticut involved a state statute requiring all
those filing a divorce action to pay approximately $60 in court costs. 401 U.S. 371, 372
(1971). Though the Court did refer to the importance of marriage in its holding, id. at
376, the case was ultimately decided based on the individual's rights to due process
and to access the court system. Id. at 388-89.
95. Bradford, supra note 93, at 623 (arguing that the right to leave a marriage and
thereby become eligible to remarry is a "valid corollary" to the right to marry):
Donna J. Zenor, Note, Untying the Knot: The Course and Patterns of Divorce Re-
form, 57 Cornell L. Rev. 649, 652 (1972) (asserting that the right to end marriage
"without unreasonable state delay, impediment, or moralism" is a corollary of the
right to marry).
96. Planned Parenthood v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 848 (1992).
97. 302 U.S. 319 (1937).
98. 431 U.S. 494 (1977) (plurality opinion).
99. Id. at 325.
100. Palko, 302 U.S. at 326.
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tion's history and tradition."1 °1  Two clauses of the Fourteenth
Amendment provide protection for fundamental rights: the Equal
Protection Clause 10 2 and the substantive component of the Due Pro-
cess Clause.
10 3
a. The Equal Protection Clause
The Court employs the Equal Protection Clause to invalidate stat-
utes that: (1) rest upon a suspect classification 0 4 or (2) restrict one
group from exercising a fundamental right that has been granted to
all. 1 5 By invalidating statutes in the second category, the Court pro-
tects fundamental rights regardless of whether the law involves a sus-
pect classification. 6
b. The Due Process Clause
The Due Process Clause protects both procedural and substantive
rights.107 As the Court recently explained:
[The Fourteenth Amendment's Due Process Clause] declares that
no State shall "deprive any person of life, liberty, or property with-
out due process of law." ... Although a literal reading of the Clause
might suggest that it governs only the procedures by which a State
may deprive persons of liberty, for at least 105 years ... the Clause
101. Moore, 431 U.S. at 503; see Washington v. Glucksberg, 117 S. Ct. 2258, 2268
(1997) (citing Palko and Moore in describing the Court's "established method" of
protecting fundamental rights through the Fourteenth Amendment's Due Process
Clause). Numerous rights have been found to fall under these formulations, including
the rights to marry, to have children, to marital privacy, to use contraception, and to
abortion. Id. at 2267 (citations omitted).
102. See Skinner v. Oklahoma, 316 U.S. 535, 538 (1942). The Equal Protection
Clause states: "No state shall ... deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal
protection of the laws." U.S. Const. amend. XIV, § 1.
103. See Allgeyer v. Louisiana, 165 U.S. 578, 591 (1897). The Due Process Clause
states: "No State shall... deprive any person of life, liberty, or property, without due
process of law." U.S. Const. amend. XIV, § 1.
104. See University of California v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265, 290 (1978) (holding that
because affirmative action laws classify people based on their race, they are subject to
strict scrutiny). Classifications based on race and ethnicity are suspect. Id. at 291.
105. See Skinner, 316 U.S. at 541, 543 (declaring a statute unconstitutional because
it subjected only certain types of criminals to sterilization, denying these criminals the
right to procreate).
106. See id. at 536, 541 (protecting the right to marry and to procreate for those
who had committed felonies "of moral turpitude," without holding that this group was
a suspect class); see also Zablocki v. Redhail, 434 U.S. 374,382 (1978) (overturning on
Equal Protection Grounds a statute that potentially denied the right to marry to the
indigent even though wealth is not a suspect classification under San Antonio In-
dependent School District v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1, 28 (1973)).
107. See Collins v. City of Harker Heights, 503 U.S. 115, 125 (1992) (explaining that
one aspect of the Due Process Clause "is to provide a guarantee of fair procedure in
connection with any deprivation of life, liberty, or property by a State," and another is
to protect "individual liberty against 'certain government actions regardless of the
fairness of the procedures used to implement them' (quoting Daniels v. Williams,
474 U.S. 327, 331 (1986))).
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has been understood to contain a substantive component as well
.... It is tempting.., to suppose that liberty encompasses no more
than those rights already guaranteed to the individual against fed-
eral interference by the express provisions of the first eight Amend-
ments to the Constitution. But of course this Court has never
accepted that view.10 8
Having recognized a substantive component, the Court has employed
the Due Process Clause both to protect fundamental rights and to
check unfairness in governmental procedures.
The Court has held that the right to marry is a fundamental right."°
As noted above, the Court historically has recognized and protected
unenumerated fights based on whether they are "of the very essence
of a scheme of ordered liberty"'110 or are "deeply rooted in this Na-
tion's history and tradition." ''1 The Court has found that marriage
falls under both Cardozo's and Powell's definitions of a fundamental
right. As for determining whether marriage is within the scheme of
ordered liberty, the Court stated in Skinner v. Oklahoma'1 2 that
"[m]arriage and procreation are fundamental to the very existence
and survival of the race.""' 3 In Loving v. Virginia,"4 the Court held
that "[t]he freedom to marry has long been recognized as one of the
vital personal rights essential to the orderly pursuit of happiness by
free men.""' 5 The right to marry is rooted in the nation's history and
traditions because marriage predates the Constitution. '16
The Court has employed both the Equal Protection Clause and the
substantive component of the Due Process Clause to protect the right
to marry. In 1942, the Court invalidated on Equal Protection grounds
a sterilization law for three-time convicts of certain crimes, in part be-
cause sterilization infringed on the fight to marry. 1 7 In 1967, the
Court first held that state infringements on the right to marry could
violate substantive due process under the Fourteenth Amendment
when it struck down Virginia's ban on inter-racial marriage."' The
Court stated that Virginia's restrictions on the right to marry could
not be sustained under the Due Process Clause by "so unsupportable
a basis""' 9 as a state's interest in classifying people by race. 2 Subse-
108. Planned Parenthood v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 846 (1992) (quoting U.S. Const.
amend. XIV) (citations omitted).
109. Zablocki, 434 U.S. at 386.
110. See Palko v. Connecticut, 302 U.S. 319, 325 (1937).
111. See Moore v. City of East Cleveland, 431 U.S. 494, 503 (1977).
112. 316 U.S. 535 (1942).
113. Id. at 541.
114. 388 U.S. 1 (1967).
115. Id at 12.
116. Id; see Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 486 (1965) (stating that mar-
riage is "a right of privacy older than the Bill of Rights").
117. Skinner, 316 U.S. at 541.
118. Loving, 388 U.S. at 12 (citing Skinner, 316 U.S. at 541).
119. Id at 12.
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quent cases have continued to ground the right in substantive due
process.
121
2. Constitutional Protection for the Right to Marry and the Right
to Intimate Association
One source for the right to marry is marriage's status as an intimate
association.' 2 The First Amendment states in part that "Congress
shall make no law... abridging the freedom of speech.., or the right
of the people peaceably to assemble.' 2 3 The right to associate in-
cludes both the right to enjoy expressive association, protected by the
First Amendment, and the right to choose to enter and maintain cer-
tain intimate relationships, protected by the Fourteenth Amend-
ment."2 4 While the Court has not identified every intimate association
that qualifies for protection,'25 the Court protects from State interfer-
ence relationships that "cultivat[e] and transmit[ ] shared ideals and
beliefs ... [and] act as critical buffers between the individual and the
power of the State."'2 6 Such relationships include "those that attend
the creation and sustenance of a family.' 1 27 Marriage's status as an
intimate association provides a constitutional justification for the sta-
tus of the right to marry as an unenumerated fundamental right.1 28
120. Id. The Court also overturned this anti-miscegenation law on Equal Protec-
tion grounds because the law reflected a race-based, suspect classification. Id.
121. See Washington v. Glucksberg, 117 S. Ct. 2258, 2267 (1997) (listing the right to
marry as one of the rights protected by substantive due process); Planned Parenthood
v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 847-48 (1992) (reaffirming Loving's protection of marriage
under substantive due process).
122. Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 486 (1965). The law at issue in Gris-
wold criminalized the use or distribution of contraception. Id. at 480. The Griswold
Court stated that while they were not "a super-legislature" in the position to overturn
laws, the Court nonetheless had to intervene because the law "operate[d] directly on
an intimate relation of husband and wife." Id. at 482.
123. U.S. Const. amend. I.
124. Roberts v. United States Jaycees, 468 U.S. 609, 617-18 (1984). The Jaycees, or
Junior Chamber of Commerce, is a non-profit corporation whose objective is to pro-
mote civic organizations and interests. Id. at 612-13. The Court has defined the right
to associate for expressive purposes as the "right to associate with others in pursuit of
a wide variety of political, social, economic, educational, religious, and cultural ends."
Id. at 622. Membership in the NAACP, for example, qualifies as an association for
expressive purposes. NAACP v. Alabama, 357 U.S. 449, 462 (1958) (characterizing
the NAACP as "an organization engaged in advocacy of particular beliefs"). The
Court in Roberts held that, because the Jaycees pursued primarily commercial rather
than political or cultural ends, the group's need for protection on expressive associa-
tion grounds was outweighed by the state's interest in advancing women's status. Rob-
erts, 468 U.S. at 626-27. The Court also held that the Jaycees lacked the intimacy and
selectivity necessary to secure protection as an intimate association. Id. at 621.
125. Roberts, 468 U.S. at 618.
126. Id. at 619 (citing Zablocki v. Redhail, 434 U.S. 374 (1978)).
127. Id. (noting that marriage constituted such a relationship).
128. The notion of marriage as a special relationship explains the law's treatment of
married people. This includes their ability to recover for negligent infliction of emo-
tional distress, see Troy A. Tureau, Bystander Recovery for Negligent Infliction of
Emotional Distress: Louisiana Enters the Twentieth Century, 37 Loy. L. Rev. 1005,
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3. The Constitutional Right to Privacy and Its Relationship to the
Right to Marry
The right to marry is also linked to a general right to privacy. 29
Like the right to marry, the right to privacy is an unenumerated right
protected by the Constitution. 30 Meyer v. Nebraska 3' and Pierce v.
Society of Sisters'3 2 are the "parents of the privacy doctrine."'t3 3 In
these cases, the Court struck down state laws that limited foreign lan-
guage instruction13 4 and private school education for schoolchil-
dren. 135  The Court interpreted these cases as involving familial
privacy,136 including the right of parents to decide what and how a
child is taught, and found a need for privacy within the familial
realm.' 37 Later, the Court used Meyer and Pierce as precedents for
overturning laws that the Court found to infringe on rights involving
the intimacies of marriage, 38 procreation, 13 9 and contraception. 40
The Court has recognized three forms of privacy: spatial privacy,' 4'
associational privacy,142 and decisional privacy. 43 Each provides pro-
tection for the right to marry. Spatial privacy refers to freedom from
1014 (1992), their privilege against testifying adversely against a spouse, see Kimberly
R. Chapman, State v. Rush. Admissibility of Out-of-Court Spousal Statements in the
Post-Freeman Context of North Carolina Marital Privilege Law, 74 N.C. L Rev. 2108,
2116 (1996), and, until somewhat recently, their immunity from prosecution for mari-
tal rape, see William N. Eskridge, Jr., The Many Faces of Sexual Consent, 37 Wm. &
Mary L. Rev. 47, 55-56 (1995).
129. See Zablocki v. Redhail, 434 U.S. 374, 383-84 (1978).
130. See Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 152 (1973) (holding that a right of personal
privacy has roots in the concept of liberty guaranteed by the Fourteenth
Amendment).
131. 262 U.S. 390 (1923) (overturning a Nebraska statute that outlawed the teach-
ing of a foreign language to children below the eighth grade level).
132. 268 U.S. 510 (1925) (striking down an Oregon statute that directed parents to
send their children to public schools).
133. Jed Rubenfeld, The Right of Privacy, 102 Harv. L. Rev. 737, 743 (1989).
134. Meyer, 262 U.S. at 403.
135. Pierce, 268 U.S. at 534-35.
136. The Court did not choose to ground the rights conferred in either an educa-
tor's right to teach a foreign language, Meyer, 262 U.S. at 396-97 (noting that the
plaintiff was an educator and that the statute placed educators at risk of prosecution
for teaching non-sanctioned languages), or a school administrator's right to run and
profit from a private school, Pierce, 268 U.S. at 532 (stating that the school claimed a
right to run a business).
137. See Rubenfeld, supra note 133, at 743 n.34.
138. See Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 482 (1965).
139. See Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 152-53 (1973).
140. See Carey v. Population Servs. Int'l, 431 U.S. 678, 685 (1977).
141. See Grisivold, 381 U.S. at 484-86 (discussing spatial privacy).
142. See id at 482-83 (discussing associational privacy).
143. See Eisenstadt v. Baird, 405 U.S. 438, 453 (1972) (focusing on decisional pri-
vacy). For a discussion of the development of decisional privacy, see Michael J.
Sandel, Moral Argument and Liberal Toleration. Abortion aiid Homosexuality, 77
Cal. L. Rev. 521, 527-28 (1989) [hereinafter Sandel, Moral Argument]. See also Ron-
ald Dworkin, Life's Dominion 53 (1993) [hereinafter Dworkin, life's Dominion]
(stating that sometimes privacy is "territorial," such as privacy in the home; some-
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governmental intrusion within a certain space, namely within the
home.14 4 The Griswold Court focused on this form of privacy, striking
down a Connecticut statute as it applied to married people, which for-
bade assistance in obtaining and using contraceptives. 145 The Court
answered its own question: "Would we allow the police to search the
sacred precincts of marital bedrooms ... ? The very idea is repulsive
to the notions of privacy surrounding the marriage relationship."1 46
That the plaintiffs wanted to use contraception in their marital1 47
home was of significance to the Griswold Court.148
The right to associational privacy also protects the marriage rela-
tionship.1 49 The Court has recognized the right to privacy within an
individual's expressive associations and intimate associations.1 50 Mar-
ried spouses, as family, share possibly the most intimate relationship:
Family relationships, by their nature, involve deep attachments and
commitments to the necessarily few other individuals with whom
one shares not only a special community of thought, experiences,
and beliefs but also distinctively personal aspects of one's life. As a
general matter, only relationships with these sorts of qualities are
likely to reflect the considerations that have led to an understanding
of freedom of association as an intrinsic element of personal
liberty.151
Due to this intimacy, family members have a right to associate and to
do so privately.1 52
Another development in privacy jurisprudence, which provides fur-
ther support for the right to marry, is the recognition of decisional
times involves "confidentiality," meaning that people should be able keep some
things secret; and at other times confers "sovereignty over personal decisions").
144. Griswold, 381 U.S. at 484-85 (explaining how the Third, Fourth, and Fifth
Amendments provide the basis for the right to privacy within the space of the home).
145. Id. at 485.
146. Id. at 485-86.
147. The Court took issue with the statute's effect on married people, as opposed to
those who are unmarried, despite the fact that the statute applied equally to each. See
id. at 480 (quoting the statute at issue, which applied to "[alny person"). Eisenstadt
extended privacy to non-married couples' decisions on contraception. 405 U.S. at 453.
But the spatial element of privacy, which hinged in Griswold on the space being "mar-
ital," was not mentioned in Eisenstadt. Instead, the Eisenstadt court analyzed a con-
traception restriction on decisional privacy grounds. Id.; see infra note 153 and
accompanying text.
148. Griswold, 381 U.S. at 484-86. The Court also grounded the right to privacy, in
part, in the penumbras of the Third Amendment, which prohibits the quartering of
soldiers in private homes in peacetime. Id. at 484.
149. Id. at 482-83 (holding that married couples have a right to associate privately
within a marriage).
150. See supra note 124.
151. Roberts v. United States Jaycees, 468 U.S. 609, 619-20 (1984).
152. See id. at 618 (stating that the Bill of Rights affords protection for "the forma-
tion and preservation of... highly personal relationships [and] a substantial measure
of sanctuary from unjustified interference by the State").
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privacy, or the autonomy to make certain decisions. 53 The Court be-
gan to protect privacy "not for the social practices it promoted [such
as marriage] but for the individual choice it secured.""t The Court
has stated that "it is clear that among the decisions that an individual
may make without unjustified governmental interference are personal
'decisions relating to marriage."' 55
The Court, then, has grounded the right to marry in several consti-
tutional sources. The amount of protection the Court has granted the
right to marry, however, is less than expected for a fundamental
right. 5 6 As explored in the next section, the Court has granted con-
siderable deference to states' marriage regulations.
B. Appropriate Level of Scrutiny for a Restriction on
the Right to Marry
This section will analyze the level of scrutiny that the Court applies
to potential infringements on the right to marry. Although the
Supreme Court has deemed the right to marry "fundamental,"" 5 the
Court has always allowed states to heavily regulate marriage. In 1888,
the Court stated in Maynard v. Hill158 that:
Marriage, as creating the most important relation in life, ... has
always been subject to the control of the legislature. That body
prescribes the age at which parties may contract to marry, the pro-
cedure or form essential to constitute marriage, the duties and obli-
gations it creates, its effects upon the property rights of both,
present and prospective, and the acts which may constitute grounds
for its dissolution.159
General restrictions on marriage are still imposed by every state's leg-
islature.160 Interestingly, the Supreme Court does not apply strict
153. See Eisenstadt v. Baird, 405 U.S. 438, 453 (1965) (holding that the right of
privacy includes the right to be free from "unwarranted governmental intrusion" in
child-bearing decisions). Michael Sandel has written on this development: -As the
meaning of privacy changed, so did its justification," for "[a]lthough privacy in Gris-
ivold prevented intrusion into 'the sacred precincts of marital bedrooms,' privacy in
Eisenstadt prevented intrusion into decisions of certain kinds." Sandel, Moral Argut-
ment, supra note 143, at 528 (quoting Griswold, 381 U.S. at 485). For elaboration of
the idea of decisional privacy or autonomy to make certain decisions, see James E.
Fleming, Securing Deliberative Autonomy, 48 Stan. L. Rev. 1 (1995). See also James E.
Fleming & Linda C. McClain, In Search of a Substantive Republic, 76 Tex. L. Rev. 509,
526-38 (1997) (criticizing Sandel's analysis of the right to decisional privacy).
154. Sandel, Moral Argunent, supra note 143, at 528.
155. Carey v. Population Servs. Int'l, 431 U.S. 678, 684-85 (1977) (quoting Roe v.
Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 152 (1973)).
156. See supra note 78 and accompanying text.
157. See supra notes 109-16 and accompanying text.
158. 125 U.S. 190 (1888).
159. Id. at 205.
160. See, e.g., Council of State Governments, The Book of the States 346 (1996-97)
(listing every state's minimum age for marriage). For examples of other restrictions
on marriage, the New York Domestic Relations Law includes the following: incestu-
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scrutiny to restrictions on the "fundamental" right to marry.161 In-
stead, the Court has applied a standard that amounts to intermediate
scrutiny. 162
1. Intermediate Scrutiny as Applied to the Right to Marry
Zablocki v. Redhail 63 illustrates how the Court has applied an in-
termediate level of scrutiny to restrictions on the right to marry.' 6
Decided in 1978, Zablocki overturned a Wisconsin law requiring any-
one having minor children without custody, but with support obliga-
tions, to show a court that: (1) he 165 had complied with the support
obligations; and (2) the children were not then, or likely to become,
public charges. 16 6 Upon failing to meet these two requirements, the
individual could not get a marriage license.1 67 Although the Court
reaffirmed that the right to marry was fundamental, 68 and strict scru-
tiny is normally appropriate, 69 the Court applied something less. The
majority first stated that the regulation significantly interfered with
the right to marry and, therefore, the asserted state interests had to be
"critically examined": 170 The statute could not stand unless it was
supported by "sufficiently important state interests" and "closely tai-
lored to effectuate only those interests. '171
This language is tantamount to intermediate scrutiny because it falls
somewhere between strict and deferential scrutiny: 7 ' The Court did
not demand compelling state interests in support of the legislation as
it would in applying strict scrutiny.' 73 Nor did the Court seek merely
ous and polygamous marriages are prohibited, N.Y. Dom. Rel. Law §§ 5, 6 (McKin-
ney 1988); an individual under the age of 14 may not marry, id. § 15-a; individuals
aged 14 or 15 must get judicial or parental consent to be married, id. § 15(3), and
African-Americans must take a sickle cell anemia test prior to receiving a marriage
license, id. § 13-aa.
161. See, e.g., Zablocki v. Redhail, 434 U.S. 374, 383 (1978) (applying intermediate
scrutiny to a restriction on the right to marry).
162. Id.
163. Id.
164. Id. at 386.
165. The statute at issue used masculine terms rather than gender-neutral language.
Id. at 375 n.1.
166. Id. at 375.
167. Id. If such person was current on support payments, then the Court would
issue an order allowing a marriage license to be granted. Id.
168. Id. at 386.
169. See supra note 78 and accompanying text.
170. Zablocki, 434 U.S. at 383.
171. Id. at 388. Interestingly, the Court cited to Carey v. Population Services Inter-
national, 431 U.S. 678, 686 (1977), as precedent for this standard. In Carey, however,
the Court employed a different standard of review, requiring the state to show "com-
pelling state interests,... narrowly drawn to express only those interests" to support
an infringement on the right to privacy. Id.
172. Nathaniel Abbate, Jr., Case Notes, 56 U. Det. J. Urb. L. 537, 548-49 (1979).
173. See supra note 78 and accompanying text (defining strict scrutiny).
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legitimate state interests as it would in applying deferential scrutiny.174
Instead, the Court required important state interests. 75 The Zablocki
Court suggested a rationale behind its choice to apply intermediate
scrutiny rather than strict scrutiny to the fundamental right at issue:
By reaffirming the fundamental character of the right to marry, we
do not mean to suggest that every state regulation which relates in
any way to the incidents of or prerequisites for marriage must be
subjected to rigorous scrutiny. To the contrary, reasonable regula-
tions that do not significantly interfere with decisions to enter into
the marital relationship may legitimately be imposed.l 7b
Less than strict scrutiny is appropriate because there are numerous
legitimate regulations on the right to marry. The Court intended to
quell challenges to necessary regulations on marriage that might be
successful if strict scrutiny were applied. 1" Wisconsin's asserted inter-
ests were to "furnish [ ] an opportunity to counsel the applicant as to
the necessity of fulfilling" child support obligations and to protect the
welfare of children.17 The Court stated that implicit in these stated
interests was the goal of encouraging delinquent parents to pay back
child support, although the law did nothing to ensure that payments
were ultimately made to children except to disallow marriage until
such support was paid.179
The majority opinion overturned the law based on the fundamental
right strand of the equal protection doctrine, not on substantive due
process grounds.1 80 The statute's court permission requirement ap-
plied only to those individuals who did not have custody of their chil-
dren and were required by court order to pay support."" Of that
group, only some individuals-those who were delinquent in making
support payments and whose children were either already, or likely to
become, wards of the state-were completely prevented from mar-
174. See supra note 85 and accompanying text (defining deferential scrutiny).
175. Zablocki, 434 U.S. at 388; cf Craig v. Boren, 429 U.S. 190, 197 (1976) (apply-
ing intermediate scrutiny by requiring important state interests to support a gender
distinction in minimum age drinking laws).
176. Zablocki, 434 U.S. at 386.
177. See id. at 399 (Powell, J., concurring) (fearing Justice Marshall's use of strict
scrutiny would interfere with state regulation of "incest. bigamy and homosexuality,
as well as various preconditions to marriage, such as blood tests"). Because Justice
Marshall did not actually apply strict scrutiny, Justice Powell's interpretation of Jus-
tice Marshall's standard of review "reflect[s] a lack of understanding ... and indi-
cate[s] a misreading of the majority opinion." Abbate, supra note 172, at 548; see also
Elizabeth G. Patterson, Health Care Choice and the Constitution: Reconciling Privacy
and Public Health, 42 Rutgers L. Rev. 1. 48 n.230 (1989) (using Zablocki to justify the
Court's choice of intermediate scrutiny in areas where "the state has traditionally
been recognized as having a significant role").
178. Zablocki, 434 U.S. at 388.
179. Id. at 389.
180. Id. at 383.
181. Id. at 375.
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rying due to their financial status.112 The Court also noted that per-
sons without the financial means to meet their support obligations
would, in effect, "be coerced into forgoing their right to marry. ' 183
Furthermore, even those who could make the payments "suffer[ed] a
serious intrusion into their freedom of choice."'18 4 The Court was also
troubled by the law's potential for discouraging marriage rather than
encouraging support payments, which could lead to extramarital rela-
tionships and illegitimate children. 8 5 Ultimately, this statute was held
unconstitutional because (1) the restriction on the right to marry
could completely preclude marriage; and (2) this preclusion or delay
of marriage did not do enough to further the asserted state goal of
getting parents to pay child support. 186 Though the state interests
were important, the measures taken were not closely tailored enough
to achieve those interests. 87 Consequently, the statute did not survive
intermediate scrutiny.18 8
2. The Undue Burden Standard
A change in the law since Zablocki raises the question of whether
the intermediate scrutiny test employed in that case would apply to a
challenge to a marriage restriction today. In 1992, the plurality opin-
ion of Planned Parenthood v. Casey189 set out a new standard of re-
view falling somewhere between strict and deferential scrutiny.1 90
The Casey Court reviewed whether several state restrictions on abor-
tion constituted an "undue burden" on the right to have an abor-
tion) 91 Casey marked the first time that even a plurality had adopted
the undue burden test, 192 although Justice O'Connor had advocated
some such test prior to Casey. 93 Several factors indicate that this
182. Id. at 387.
183. Id.
184. Id. While the Court did not explicitly explain how those who can make the
payments suffer an intrusion into their freedom of choice, the law did interfere with
one's choice on how to spend money.
185. Id. at 390 (stating that "preventing the marriage may only result in ... children
being born out of wedlock... [and] the net result of preventing the marriage is simply
more illegitimate children").
186. Id. at 389 (stating that though the statute provided an incentive to make sup-
port payments, it did nothing to actually deliver money into children's hands, and,
therefore, was unjustifiable).
187. Id. at 389-90.
188. Id. at 390-91.
189. 505 U.S. 833, 877 (1992) (plurality opinion).
190. Id. at 874 (plurality opinion).
191. Id. at 877 (plurality opinion).
192. See Kathryn Kolbert & David H. Gans, Responding to Planned Parenthood v.
Casey: Establishing Neutrality Principles in State Constitutional Law, 66 Temp. L.
Rev. 1151, 1154 (1993).
193. See Simopoulos v. Virginia, 462 U.S. 506, 520 (1983) (O'Connor, J., concur-
ring) (stating that a mandatory hospitalization requirement was constitutional be-
cause it was not an undue burden); City of Akron v. Akron Ctr. for Reprod. Health,
Inc. 462 U.S. 416, 464 (1983) (O'Connor, J., dissenting) (defining undue burden as an
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standard may apply to future cases that analyze restrictions on the
right to marry. Zablocki, where the Court used some variation of in-
termediate scrutiny to analyze the right to marry, is a precedent for
Casey's undue burden test,194 indicating that the undue burden stan-
dard might be the appropriate standard for analyzing a right to marry
case. Though Casey is not authoritative for right to marry cases, the
subsequent analysis demonstrates why the undue burden test is the
best method of analysis for such an inquiry. The following section will
analyze in detail the Court's holding in Casey to provide insight on
what constitutes an undue burden.
a. Planned Parenthood v. Casey
In Casey, restrictions on abortion and on the decision to have one
are permissible, provided the individual is not unduly burdened by
some substantial obstacle.1 95 The government may encourage an indi-
vidual to make a particular decision if the decision ultimately rests
with the individual." 6 If the encouragement rises to the level of coer-
cion, or even a substantial obstacle, the burden becomes undue and,
consequently, unconstitutional. 197 Although the Court did not define
"coercion" or "substantial obstacle," its analysis of the provisions of
"absolute obstacle[ ] or severe limitation[ ] on the abortion decision"). Justice Scalia's
dissent in Casey, however, stated that Justice O'Connor's earlier opinions that em-
ployed the undue burden test used stronger terms to characterize the obstacle, such as
"absolute" or "severe" instead of "substantial," and that the analysis was used to "ex-
press[ ] the conclusion of unconstitutionality" after applying some other standard of
review to a statute and finding it passed, rather than to lay out a standard of unconsti-
tutionality. Casey, 505 U.S. at 985 n.3 (Scalia, J., dissenting). Scalia called the plural-
ity opinion's formulation "an entirely new version of 'undue burden' analysis." Id.
Indeed, the plurality also recognized that this version was new, stating that it was
"refin[ing] the undue burden analysis." Id. at 879.
194. See Alan Brownstein, How Rights Are Infringed: The Role of Undue Burden
Analysis in Constitutional Doctrine, 45 Hastings L.J. 867, 895 (1994) (labeling
Zablocki "a particularly important precedent for the Casey plurality's 'undue burden
test' because the opinion "adopted a substantial burden threshold" and "focuse[d]
on the magnitude of the burden" on the right at issue). In defining "threshold," Pro-
fessor Brownstein maintains that Zablocki, like Casey, first determined the weight of
the burden before deciding the applicable level of scrutiny. See id.; Valerie J. Pacer,
Note, Salvaging the Undue Burden Standard-Is It a Lost Cause? The Undue Burden
Standard and Fundamental Rights Analysis, 73 Wash. U. LQ. 295, 301 (1995) (stating
that the Court "used phrases suggestive of an undue burden anal)sis" in Zablocki);
see also Michael C. Dorf, Incidental Burdens on Fundamental Rights, 109 Harv. L
Rev. 1175, 1220 (1996) (writing that the language used by the Zablocki Court for its
level of scrutiny "closely parallels that of the undue burden standard of Casey" in
concluding that "the Casey standard is not anomalous in the Court's privacy doc-
trine"). Interestingly, Dorf was ond of Justice O'Connor's law clerks during the term
Casey was decided.
195. Casey, 505 U.S. at 874 (plurality opinion). Casey applied the undue burden
test to regulations affecting the decision to have an abortion. Id. at 833; see infra note
245 and accompanying text (discussing the applicability of the undue burden test to
other individual rights).
196. Casey, 505 U.S. at 877-78 (plurality opinion).
197. Id. at 877 (plurality opinion).
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Pennsylvania's abortion statutes provides some guidance on those
questions.
Casey involved a challenge by several abortion clinics and a physi-
cian to the Pennsylvania abortion statute. 198 The challenged portions
of the statute required: 199 (1) informed consent; (2) a 24-hour waiting
period after receiving information on abortion; (3) parental consent
for minors wanting an abortion, with a judicial bypass option; (4)
spousal notification of any planned abortion, with some exceptions;
and (5) reporting requirements for facilities providing abortion serv-
ices.2°0 Pennsylvania's asserted interests were encouraging childbirth
201over abortion, promoting thoughtful decisions on abortion, and en-
suring health standards.2°
Applying the undue burden standard, the Court upheld all 2 3 but
the spousal notification requirement.20 4 The informed consent re-
quirement directed physicians to inform the woman of the "nature of
the procedure, the health risks of the abortion and of childbirth, and
the 'probable gestational age' of the fetus.20 5 The attending physi-
cian had to tell the woman that state-provided materials on abortion
and childbirth were available to her, and the woman had to attest to
her knowledge of these materials, although she was not required to
take or read the information.20 6 The Court declared that the informed
consent requirement was not an undue burden, but "a reasonable
measure to ensure an informed choice, one which might cause the wo-
man to choose childbirth over abortion. 20 7
The 24-hour waiting period requirement also did not rise to the
level of an undue burden.208 Having once held that a 24-hour delay
for an abortion did not reasonably serve the concern that a woman's
198. Id. at 844-45.
199. Each of the requirements applied in the absence of a "medical emergency." Id.
at 844. The statute defined a medical emergency as a condition where, unless a wo-
man undergoes an immediate abortion, she faces death or serious risk of substantial
or irreversible impairment of a major bodily function. Id. at 879 (plurality opinion).
The Court held that this definition was constitutional. Id. at 880.
200. Id. at 844. The reporting requirements mandated that every abortion clinic
must file a report to the state for every abortion performed. Id. at 900 (plurality opin-
ion). Such reports included, but were not limited to, information identifying the phy-
sician involved, the woman's age, the type of procedure, any medical complications,
and the weight of the aborted fetus. Id.
201. See id. at 872 (plurality opinion).
202. See id. at 900 (plurality opinion).
203. Id. at 881-87 (plurality opinion).
204. Id. at 887-901.
205. Id. at 881 (plurality opinion).
206. Id. The materials consisted of information on the fetus, available childbirth
medical assistance, paternal child support requirements, and adoption services. Id.
207. Id. at 883 (plurality opinion).
208. Id. at 885-86.
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decision be informed,2 °9 the Court reversed itself, stating that "[t]he
idea that important decisions will be more informed and deliberate if
they follow some period of reflection does not strike us as unreasona-
ble. '2 10 Even given the possibility of two long trips to the closest
clinic and increased exposure to anti-abortion protesters,2 1 the Court
did not find the waiting period a substantial obstacle to the right to
abortion.212 This method of aiding a woman in understanding the full
consequences of her decision did not constitute an undue burden.2 13
The Court also upheld the parental notification and consent re-
quirement for women under eighteen and the reporting requirements
for abortion facilities.2"4 The Pennsylvania statute required that, to
obtain an abortion, a minor must secure consent from one parent or,
in the alternative, obtain authorization from a court. 215 Having previ-
ously upheld a similar parental consent provision, 1 6 the Court agreed
that the Pennsylvania restriction was constitutional.2 17 Likewise, the
Court, following precedent,218 found the reporting requirement con-
stitutional.219 The Court found a relationship between the provision
and the state interest: "Although [the provisions] do not relate to the
State's interest in informing the woman's choice, they do relate to
health."'  Despite the fact that the reporting requirements would
likely increase the cost of abortion, the increase did not rise to the
level of a substantial burden, given that patient information is "a vital
element of medical research."'"
The spousal notification law was the one provision of the Penn-
sylvania law found to be an undue burden.'n The stipulation required
that no physician perform an abortion without obtaining a signed
statement from the woman that she had informed her husband of her
209. City of Akron v. Akron Ctr. for Reprod. Health, Inc., 462 U.S. 416,450 (1983)(finding it unconvincing that the interest in a woman's informed decision was "reason-
ably served" by an "arbitrary and inflexible waiting period").
210. Casey, 505 U.S. at 885 (plurality opinion).
211. Id. at 885-86 (plurality opinion) (recognizing, but ultimately dismissing, the
district court's concerns that women must often travel long distances to reach the
nearest clinic and could face hostile anti-abortion protesters).
212. ld. at 886 (plurality opinion).
213. Id. at 881-87 (plurality opinion).
214. ld. at 899-901 (plurality opinion).
215. kd- at 899-900 (plurality opinion).
216. Cf. Ohio v. Akron Ctr. for Reprod. Health, 497 U.S. 502, 510-19 (1990) (up-
holding an Ohio parental consent law with a judicial bypass clause in the abortion
context).
217. Casey, 505 U.S. at 899 (plurality opinion).
218. See Planned Parenthood v. Danforth, 428 U.S. 52, 80 (1976) (holding that
"[r]ecordkeeping and reporting requirements that are reasonably directed to the pres-
ervation of maternal health and that properly respect a patient's confidentiality and
privacy are permissible").
219. Casey, 505 U.S. at 900-01 (plurality opinion).
220. Id. (plurality opinion).
221. Id. at 901.
222. Id. at 893-94.
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choice to have an abortion.223 Otherwise, the woman must provide
one of the following statements: (1) that she was impregnated by
someone other than her husband; (2) that her husband could not be
located; (3) that the pregnancy was the result of reported spousal
rape; or (4) that she believed that telling her.husband would result in
bodily injury to her person.224 In finding an undue burden, the Court
quoted the district court's detailed findings of fact as to the non-physi-
cal harm that could befall a woman as a result of notifying her hus-
band of an unwanted pregnancy.2 5 The Court also emphasized the
pervasiveness of wife battering.226 If a woman is the victim of abuse,
she may meet the sexual assault or bodily injury exception, but be-
cause few women in these situations are willing to disclose such abuse,
these exceptions would not help many abused women.227 Due to the
presence and threat of both physical and non-physical injury, the noti-
fication requirement would "likely... prevent a significant number of
women from obtaining an abortion. '228 The provision, therefore, did
not pass the undue burden test.229
Casey requires that even regulations that do not impose an undue
burden on an individual right must pass rational basis review. 230 The
Court appears to have a high standard for what constitutes an undue
burden.23' For example, the Court upheld the 24-hour waiting period
despite recognizing that it created real obstacles, such as two lengthy
223. Id. at 887.
224. Id.
225. Id. at 888 (listing numerous injuries, such as verbal harassment, the withdrawal
of financial support, as well as abuse to one's children, that would not meet the "bod-
ily injury" exception).
226. Id. at 888-93. The Court cited surveys which showed, for example, that every
year two million women are severely beaten by their male partners and that, in a
given year, one in eight husbands assaulted their wives. Id. at 891.
227. See id. at 890 (agreeing with a district court finding that "[b]ecause of the na-
ture of the battering relationship, battered women are unlikely to avail themselves of
the exceptions [of the statute]").
228. Id. at 893.
229. Id. at 895.
230. Id. at 878 (plurality opinion) (stating that, unless a regulation imposes a sub-
stantial burden on choosing an abortion, "a state measure designed to persuade her to
choose childbirth over abortion will be upheld if reasonably related to that goal" (em-
phasis added)).
231. See Robin L. West, The Nature of the Right to an Abortion: A Commentary on
Professor Brownstein's Analysis of Casey, 45 Hastings L.J. 961, 961 (1994) [hereinaf-
ter West, Commentary] (asserting that the effect of Casey will be "an increase in the
number of state regulations that will significantly, whether or not [in the Court's view]
unduly, burden" access to abortion); see also C. Elaine Howard, Note, The Roe'd to
Confitsion: Planned Parenthood v. Casey, 30 Hous. L. Rev. 1457, 1481 (1993) (claim-
ing that by "holding that trauma, delay and harassment were not unduly burdensome,
the Court seemed to believe that the standard contemplates not a substantial obstacle,
but a complete impasse"); Jeanne L. Vance, Note, Womb for Rent. Norplant and the
Undoing of Poor Women, 21 Hastings Const. L.Q. 827, 837 (1994) (stating that the
Court is "unwilling to find excessive restrictions to be undue").
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trips to a clinic.3 2 The Court, meanwhile, ignored burdens on minors
posed by parental consent. For example, a pregnant minor may be a
victim of parental physical or sexual abuse, or may be devastated at
the prospect of disappointing her parents. A minor in one of these
situations may even attempt self-abortion. "- 3 That these real potential
burdens were not discussed by the Court signals the high showing of
"burden" the undue burden test entails. Thus, it appears that com-
plete preclusion of the ability to exercise a right is undue, but that
highly burdensome restrictions do not rise to that level, provided they
rationally further a legitimate state interest.234
b. Application of the Undue Burden Standard Outside the
Abortion Context
Because Casey involved an abortion statute, and the Court has not
yet applied the undue burden test to cases not involving the right to
abortion, it is unclear whether the undue burden test is applicable
outside the abortion context.3 5 Lower federal courts, however, have
not interpreted Casey as limited to abortion cases and have applied
the undue burden standard to cases involving the right to die"' and
the right to privacy.237
232. Casey, 505 U.S. at 885-86 (plurality opinion). The Court's different treatment
of parental consent and spousal notification prerequisites before obtaining an abor-
tion is commensurate with the Court's view of minors' rights; the Court has consist-
ently held that minors do not always enjoy the same protections as adults. See Reno v.
ACLU, 117 S. Ct. 2329, 2347-48 (1997) (striking down a statute which criminalized
placing obscene material on the Internet because it limited information for adults, but
implying that if it was possible to restrict minor viewing only, the statute would be
constitutional); Ginsberg v. New York, 390 U.S. 629, 634-37 (1968) (upholding a stat-
ute which criminalized the sale of certain material deemed obscene to minors but
allowed the sale of the same material to adults).
233. See Vance, supra note 231, at 837-38 (listing these scenarios as proof that the
Court ignored reality when determining that Pennsylvania's parental notification pro-
vision was not an undue burden). For another potential risk, see Interview by Nina
Totenberg with Walter Dellinger, Former Acting Solicitor General, Morning Edition
(National Public Radio broadcast, Jan. 21, 1998), available in 1998 WL 3306120, stat-
ing that parental notification requirements increase the number of late-term
abortions.
234. See Casey, 505 U.S. at 885 (plurality opinion) (requiring only that it was not
unreasonable to assume that waiting periods resulted in more informed decisions
when upholding the mandated delay in abortions).
235. Justice Souter has written that, of all the Court-employed standards of review,
the undue burden test is the appropriate standard for abortion regulation, Planned
Parenthood v. Casey, 510 U.S. 1309, 1312-13 (1994) (Souter, J., in chambers), but he
did not indicate that the standard was, hence, limited to abortion cases. See id.
236. Compassion in Dying v. Washington, 850 F. Supp. 1454, 1464-66 (W.D. Wash.
1994), rev'd, 49 F.3d 586 (9th Cir. 1995), affd en banc, 79 F.3d 790 (9th Cir. 1996),
rev'd sub non., Washington v. Glucksberg, 117 S. CL 2258 (1997).
237. Doe v. Sundquist, 106 F.3d 702, 706 (6th Cir. 1997) (holding that a Tennessee
statute allowing disclosure of formerly confidential adoption records did not violate
any right to familial privacy and did not unduly burden the adoption process (citing
Casey, 505 U.S. at 874-79 (plurality opinion))).
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In Compassion in Dying v. Washington, the Western District of
Washington applied the undue burden standard in a case challenging a
law prohibiting physician-assisted suicide238 and held that the statute
was an undue burden on the right to die.239 Once that case reached
the Supreme Court under the name Washington v. Glucksberg,240
however, the Court did not utilize the undue burden standard. In-
stead, the Court used a less stringent standard2 41 because it found that
unlike the rights to marry and to abortion, 42 the right to assisted sui-
cide is not a constitutional right.2 43 The analysis in Glucksberg indi-
cates that the undue burden test is inappropriate for infringements on
interests that do not rise to the level of constitutional rights, but does
not imply that the undue burden standard is inappropriate for chal-
lenged statutes that infringe fundamental rights other than abortion.
The undue burden test has been characterized as a synthesis of the
three traditional levels of review that were never truly structured
along bright lines, rather than as a new test limited to abortion
cases.244 This analysis implies that the undue burden test would apply
to other rights. When delineating the undue burden standard, the
Casey joint opinion associated the decision to have an abortion with
decisions involving "marriage, procreation, contraception, family rela-
tionships, child rearing, and education. '2 45  This may imply that
Casey's undue burden test should be authoritative in cases involving
these rights. 246 Additionally, in Casey, the Court noted that abortion
is a somewhat "unique" act because it is "fraught with consequences
for others. '247 Marriage is also an act that affects many others, partic-
ularly if a couple has children and ultimately gets divorced. There-
fore, the undue burden test may be applicable when individual actions
affect others so personally.
238. Compassion in Dying, 850 F. Supp. at 1464-66.
239. Id. at 1465.
240. 117 S. Ct. 2258 (1997).
241. Id. at 2271 (applying a rational relationship standard); see also id. at 2262 n.5(explaining how the district court used the undue burden standard instead of the stan-
dard from United States v. Salerno, 481 U.S. 739 (1987)). United States v. Salerno
involved a facial challenge to an assisted-suicide ban, and the Court stated that the
challengers had to show that "no set of circumstances exists under which the [law]
would be valid." 481 U.S. 739, 745 (1987).
242. Glucksberg, 117 S. Ct. at 2267.
243. Id. at 2271.
244. See Brownstein, supra note 194, at 876-77.
245. Planned Parenthood v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 851 (1992).
246. See Jon S. Lerner, Comment, Protecting Home Schooling Through the Casey
Undue Burden Standard, 62 U. Chi. L. Rev. 363, 370 (1995) (arguing for the applica-
tion of the undue burden standard to evaluate home schooling because home school-
ing and abortion share "common jurisprudential ground" in that the issues both have
precedents in privacy cases); Vance, supra note 231, at 838 (asserting that "[blecause
abortion and procreative rights both fall within the constitutional rubric of 'privacy,' it
is entirely possible that the Casey decision will implicate the other rights within the
privacy classification").
247. Casey, 505 U.S. at 852.
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In contrast to the Court's earlier focus on the individual's "'right to
be let alone," 248 in Casey, the Court considered the impact the exer-
cise of rights would have on people other than the actor. The govern-
ment has increasingly taken a role in shaping citizens' behavior,
hoping that individuals will act in ways beneficial to themselves,
others, and society.249 The Court has upheld state measures that en-
courage reflection in the hope of fostering more responsible decisions
regarding abortion 20 and the refusal of medical treatment.!- Be-
cause the Court has recently supported several attempts to encourage
responsible decision-making, demonstrating deference to such state
efforts, the Court might also defer to covenant marriage laws. These
measures are similar to covenant marriage laws because they are ef-
248. Justices who recently have invoked the right to be let alone tend to be in dis-
sent, whereas in the past, they were writing majority opinions. Compare Bowers v.
Hardwick, 478 U.S. 186, 199 (1986) (Blackmun, J., dissenting) (stating that the major-
ity failed to see that the case involved "'the right to be let alone"' (quoting Olmstead
v. United States., 277 U.S. 438, 478 (1928) (Brandeis. J., dissenting))), with Whalen v.
Roe, 429 U.S. 589, 598-604 (1977) (overturning a mandatory reporting requirement
for certain drug prescriptions based in part on the right to be let alone), and Griswold
v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 485 (1965) (citing law review article Erwin N. Griswold,
The Right to be Let Alone, 55 Nw. U. L. Rev. 216 (1960)). The Court has held that the
right to be let alone involves the right to bodily integrity, Winston i' Lee, 470 U.S. 753,
758, 761 (1985), and the right to avoid disclosure of personal matters. Whalen, 429
U.S. at 598-99.
249. See Cass R. Sunstein, Social Norms and Social Roles, 96 Colum. L Rev. 903.
904-07 (1996) (discussing government efforts to shape behavior by, for example, pro-
moting recycling and discouraging smoking).
250. In Roe v. Wade, the Court supported the fight to have an abortion based on
the presumption that a physician's involvement in this medical decision would assure
that the choice was made responsibly. 410 U.S. 113, 166 (1973). In Casey, the state
government appropriated the role of ensuring that women will make the decision to
have an abortion responsibly. See Linda C. McClain, The Poverty of Privacy?. 3
Colum. J. Gender & L. 119, 139-42 (1992).
251. In Cruzan v. Missouri Department of Health, the Court held that individuals
have a liberty interest in refusing lifesaving treatment. 497 U.S. 261, 278 (1990), but
upheld a Missouri statute requiring clear and convincing evidence of an incompetent
patient's intent to refuse treatment. Id. at 284. The clear and convincing evidence
requirement ensured that any of the patient's expressions on the subject of refusing
treatment if mentally incapacitated, later acted on by caretakers, were carefully con-
sidered. See id. at 281. Furthermore, the requirement prohibited family members
from making wholly self-interested or hasty decisions regarding the patient's future.
Id. Recently, in Washington v. Glucksberg, the Court held that there is no liberty
interest or right to physician-assisted suicide: the decision was reached in part by con-
sidering the number of people who may make rash decisions in requesting assisted
suicide. See 117 S. Ct. 2258, 2272-73 (1997). The majority noted that those who at-
tempt suicide often suffer from mental disorders, including depression, implying that
ending one's own life is often a result of a temporary and impulsive urges. hl. at 2272.
The Court also expressed concern for disadvantaged people who may be pressured
into ending their lives by their families. Id. at 2273. This decision is similar to Cruzan,
where the Court also protected patients from themselves and also from their families'
irresponsible decisions by upholding a statute that established obstacles to refusing
life-sustaining medical treatment. 497 U.S. at 281.
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forts to get people to think before they act.252 Louisiana is attempting
to discourage divorce and to encourage couples to reflect on their de-
cision to marry or divorce prior to taking either action.253 Given the
similarities between the underlying rights in the covenant marriage
and abortion cases, the Court is likely to apply the undue burden test
to any challenge to covenant marriage legislation. The next section
analyzes the viability of such a constitutional challenge to Louisiana's
covenant marriage statute.
III. CONSTITUTIONAL AND POLICY IMPLICATIONS OF COVENANT
MARRIAGE LAWS
Covenant marriage laws regulate the constitutional right to marry.
Thus, plaintiffs may challenge Louisiana's covenant marriage law as
an unconstitutional infringement on that right. The following section
analyzes Louisiana's marriage laws by presenting hypothetical plain-
tiffs contesting the statute on various grounds.
A. Applying the Undue Burden Analysis to Louisiana's Covenant
Marriage Statute
In order to apply the undue burden to Louisiana's covenant mar-
riage law, this section employs a hypothetical challenge to the consti-
tutionality of covenant marriage laws involving two couples, Couple A
and Couple B. To successfully establish an undue burden on the con-
stitutional right to marry, they must show that the requirements of
covenant marriage statutes pose a substantial obstacle on their deci-
sion to marry. 4 The first step of the undue burden analysis is to
question whether any of the above complaints pose a substantial ob-
stacle to an individual's exercise of the right to marry. 5 Under
Casey, if the answer is no, then the statute need only pass rational
basis review.256 If the answer is yes, then the law is unconstitutional
and cannot stand. 5 7
252. For example, the regulations included a provision for a 24-hour waiting period,
Casey, 505 U.S. at 885 (plurality opinion), and Louisiana's covenant marriage law
includes a mandatory counseling requirement, La. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 9:273 (A)(2)(a)
(West Supp. 1998), which may delay marriage, and a lengthy separation period prior
to divorce. Id. § 9:307(a)(5). The Court said in Casey that "[t]he idea that important
decisions will be more informed and deliberate if they follow some period of reflec-
tion does not strike us as unreasonable." Casey, 505 U.S. at 885 (plurality opinion).
253. See infra note 298 and accompanying text.
254. See supra Part II.B.2.b (explaining how the undue burden test applies to right
to marry cases).
255. See Casey, 505 U.S. at 877 (plurality opinion).
256. See id. at 878 (plurality opinion); see also supra note 85 and accompanying text
(defining rational basis review).
257. See Casey, 505 U.S. at 878 (plurality opinion).
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1. Couple A
Couple A chose covenant marriage when they selected their mar-
riage license. This couple believes that they were coerced into the
covenant marriage option because Louisiana implicitly endorsed it as
the more committed and sacred-and, therefore, preferable-choice
of marriage. In light of Casey, the couple argues that the state may
not coerce individuals into making certain decisions that restrict their
fundamental rights.2 s Couple A contests that they are now locked
into a marriage that significantly restricts their ability to divorce.
Couple A claims that Louisiana's covenant marriage law is coercive.
If covenant marriage laws are coercive, the coercion must occur
through the government's creation of a type of marriage that is self-
defined as more sacred, more committed, and generally preferred. Li-
cense seekers are then forced to choose the covenant marriage and,
hence, are bound by stricter divorce laws. Under certain circum-
stances, individuals desiring to marry would not even consider stan-
dard marriage as the availability of a covenant marriage would
prompt their spouse, their family, or their government to view them as
undedicated or unprincipled. Casey held that once a decision impli-
cating one's fundamental rights no longer rested with the individual,
due to a state law restriction on free choice, there exists a significant
obstacle to exercising the right at issue 59 Thus, Louisiana's covenant
marriage law poses an undue burden on Couple A's right to marry.
In response, Louisiana would likely deny that its covenant marriage
law is coercive, but may agree that it probably influences couples in
their decisionmaking process. Under Casey, influence does not consti-
tute a substantial obstacle to individual decisionmaking.2 1 Louisiana
is not forcing anyone seeking marriage licenses to enter into a cove-
nant marriage; standard marriage is still available. 21 Additionally,
there is a strong argument that having two different types of marriage
to choose from does not impede the right to marry because one is still
free to choose the standard marriage.262 Indeed, since the enactment
of covenant marriage law in Louisiana, very few couples have chosen
258. Cf. id. at 877 (plurality opinion) (stating, in the abortion context, that the wo-
man, not the state, must have the right to make the "ultimate decision").
259. Id-
260. See id. at 877-78 (plurality opinion).
261. See La. Civ. Code Ann. art. 87 (West 1993).
262. See Etzioni, supra note 12 (stating that covenant marriage laws may enhance
the exercise of autonomy by creating alternatives from which couples may select).
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the covenant option.263 This again provides support for Louisiana's
position that the law is not coercive.?"
The coercion argument used to oppose covenant marriage is analo-
gous to a strategy that plaintiffs unsuccessfully employed in Harris v.
McRae.265 In McRae, the Court upheld the Hyde Amendment, which
denied public funding of some medically necessary abortions to poor
pregnant women on Medicaid while providing public funds for child-
birth.266 The law was challenged on several grounds. Plaintiffs argued
that the Hyde Amendment improperly coerced women to carry fe-
tuses to term notwithstanding the women's constitutional right to have
an abortion.267 Without funding, some women would be unable to
pay for an abortion and the option to have one would be, as a practi-
cal matter, unavailable.268 The Court rejected this argument, stating
that the Constitution did not prevent any state from "making 'a value
judgment favoring childbirth over abortion."'26 9 The government is
not required to provide the resources to fund the choice to have an
abortion, however, that choice must remain open.270 The federal gov-
ernment in McRae "imposed no restriction on access to abortions that
was not already there,"' 271 it just "may have made childbirth the more
attractive alternative. 27 2 By providing funding for childbirth but not
abortion, the government brands as preferable the choice to carry the
child to term, an entirely permissible state action. 273 The Court noted
the difference between "State attempts to impose its will by force of
law" and "the State's power to encourage actions deemed to be in the
public interest. '274 The Court did not view the Hyde Amendment as
263. Leslie Zganjar, Louisiana Couples Choose Covenant Marriage, Charleston (W.
Va.) Gazette, Feb. 14, 1998, at C3 (reporting that, out of 11,169 marriage licenses
issued since August 15, 1997, the day the covenant marriage law went into effect, only
120 licenses, or one percent, were for covenant marriage).
264. The coercion argument would be greatly weakened if the number of people
choosing covenant marriage continues to be low. Id. (reporting the low ratio of cove-
nant marriages to total marriages in Louisiana). At this early stage, it is impossible to
tell why Louisianans are not entering covenant marriages, but one argument is that
not enough people know that the option exists. Janet McConnaughey, Covenant Mar-
riages Slow-Going in State, Times-Picayune (New Orleans), Oct. 19, 1997, at A4 (re-
porting that the law's drafter believes people are unaware of the law, though they will
become more aware with time). If this is the case, the number of covenant marriages
could increase over time, and the coercion argument would gain strength.
265. 448 U.S. 297 (1980).
266. Id. at 326-27.
267. See id. at 301, 315; Appellee's Brief at 61-63, 121, Harris v. McRae, 448 U.S.
297 (1980) (No. 79-1268).
268. See McRae, 448 U.S. at 315.
269. Id. at 314 (quoting Maher v. Roe, 432 U.S. 464, 474 (1977) (upholding a state
statute that paid Medicaid recipients for childbirth expenses, but not for nontherapeu-
tic abortions)).
270. See id. at 316.
271. Id. at 314 (quoting Maher, 432 U.S. at 474).
272. Id. (quoting Maher, 432 U.S. at 474).
273. See id. at 315.
274. Id.
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infringing on the right to decide whether to terminate a pregnancy;
rather, it saw any existing restriction as a product of the woman's indi-
gency, not of governmental action. -75
The Court's analysis in McRae can be analogized to reject argu-
ments that covenant marriage laws coerce people into choosing the
covenant marriage option. In Louisiana's covenant marriage system,
the original formulation of marriage still remains open,76 just as the
abortion option remained available for all women after the Hyde
Amendment passed. 77 In McRae, the Court found that the obstacle
to abortion under the Hyde Amendment was not any action by the
government but was, instead, a woman's indigency1 78 Unlike the
plaintiff's indigent status in McRae, it is difficult to pinpoint what it is
about a person that would facilitate government coercion into cove-
nant marriage. Presumably, that characteristic would be less tangible
than a person's indigency, a status which the Court has held is not
constitutionally protected. The coercive element of covenant mar-
riage laws, therefore, is less likely than the McRae restrictions to pose
a substantial obstacle to the exercise of a right.
Couple A also claims that once in a covenant marriage, the strict
divorce requirements infringe on the right to divorce and remarry. If
the Court concludes that the existence of covenant marriage does not
unconstitutionally coerce a person, however, any infringement on the
right to divorce or remarry would be similarly uncoerced. Indeed,
even in the absence of covenant marriage, if Louisiana made its di-
vorce requirements stricter, this would still be constitutional. The
Court has never recognized a constitutional right to divorce.27 9 Justice
Marshall, in dissent in Sosna v. Iowa,.28° linked the right to marry to
the right to divorce.2" If individuals cannot obtain a divorce, clearly
275. Id. at 316. The dissenters vehemently disagreed, asserting that the Hyde
Amendment "serves to coerce indigent pregnant women to bear children that they
would otherwise elect not to have." Id. at 330 (Brennan, J., dissenting). Justice Bren-
nan called the law "a transparent attempt by the Legislative Branch to impose the
political majority's judgment of the morally acceptable and socially desirable prefer-
ence on a sensitive and intimate decision that the Constitution entrusts to the individ-
ual." Id. at 332 (Brennan, J., dissenting). Justice Marshall, whose emphasis on
freedom of choice prevailed in Zablocki v. Redhail, 434 U.S. 374 (1978), joined the
dissent in McRae, holding that "denial of a Medicaid-funded abortion is equivalent to
denial of legal abortion altogether." McRae, 448 U.S. at 338 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
Interestingly, the fact that a poor individual could be denied a marriage license was
important to the majority's analysis in Zablocki, 434 U.S. at 387, while in McRae, the
majority was unaffected by the fact that the statute limited the poor alone. McRae,
448 U.S. at 316.
276. See supra note 38 and accompanying text.
277. McRae, 448 U.S. at 316-17.
278. Id. at 316.
279. Bradford, supra note 93, at 622.
280. 419 U.S. 393 (1975).
281. Id. at 420 (Marshall, J., dissenting) (asserting that the rights to marry and to
divorce are "closely related" and that "the interest in obtaining a divorce is of sub-
stantial social importance").
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they cannot exercise their right to remarry.282 Nevertheless, the Sosna
Court upheld an Iowa statute which imposed a one-year residency re-
quirement for those filing for divorce.283 The Sosna majority held the
requirement did not impose a constitutionally impermissible infringe-
ment on the right to travel,28' and failed to recognize either a right to
divorce or to remarry that the statute at issue could potentially in-
fringe.285 Thus, Couple A's challenges of Louisiana's covenant mar-
riage law likely would be ultimately unsuccessful.
2. Couple B
Couple B lives in Louisiana and wants to get married. Couple B
can opt to enter a covenant marriage or a standard marriage, yet they
do not want to enter into a regular marriage because of the stigma
that attaches to those entering into a marriage the state considers less
sacred than a covenant.286 Couple B does not want to choose a cove-
nant marriage, however, due to its stringent divorce restrictions.2 17
Couple B argues that the choices created by the covenant marriage
law are dissuading them from getting married at all, interfering with
their constitutional right to marry and their right to make autonomous
choices. To support their argument opposing the act, Couple B prof-
fers a recent affirmative action case holding that a seemingly benign
law which attaches a stigma to a group of individuals is
unconstitutional.288
Couple B claims Louisiana provides two undesirable marriage
types, which poses an undue burden on their right to marry. The first
option, regular marriage, is inadequate because of the stigma placed
on those who take part in it.289 In Adarand Constructors v. Pena, the
Court explained that although affirmative action programs increase
opportunities for minorities, they stigmatize their beneficiaries.2 10 Ac-
282. See Bradford, supra note 93, at 622-24.
283. Sosna, 419 U.S. at 408-09. Under the challenged statute, a person petitioning
the Iowa courts for a divorce must have been an Iowa resident for one year preceding
the filing of the petition. Id. at 395 n.1.
284. Id. at 405-09.
285. See id.
286. See infra note 322.
287. See supra notes 30-36 and accompanying text (describing covenant marriage's
divorce options).
288. See Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. Pena, 515 U.S. 200, 229 (1995) (striking
down a "benign" federal affirmative action program that benefited minorities in part
due to the stigma that attaches to a minority group considered in need of assistance
and somehow less qualified than other races).
289. See McConnaughey, supra note 264 (reporting that a Louisiana rabbi rejects
covenant marriages because they imply "that some marriages are not sacred" when all
marriages should be); see also Editorial, "Super Marriage" Hasn't Caught On, Baton
Rouge Advocate, Oct. 29, 1997, at B10 (reporting on a Baptist leader's rejection of
covenant marriage because he had "never been willing to give in to the idea that a
regular marriage is something less than a covenant one").
290. 515 U.S. at 229.
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cording to the Court, affirmative action fosters the assumption that
minorities are less qualified, which creates, rather than reduces, racial
problems.29 This prompted the Court to treat affirmative action
plans with the same skepticism as initiatives that had a discriminatory
purpose toward or effect on ethnic and racial minorities. 2 2 The gov-
ernment should avoid remedies that stigmatize what they want to en-
rich: the status of minorities in the affirmative action context and that
of marriage in the covenant marriage context.
In response, Louisiana would likely assert that covenant marriage
laws are less like the situation the Court addressed in Adarand and
more like that in Planned Parenthood v. Casey. The state government
in Casey preferred childbirth to abortion,293 but the Court did not find
any constitutional stigma.2 94 Preferring childbirth over abortions fur-
thered the government's interest in potential life. 295 By analogy, pre-
ferring covenant marriage over standard marriage arguably furthers
an interest in decreasing broken marriages. Casey and Adarand in-
volve situations in which the government preferred one result over
another. In Adarand, however, the Court found that preferring mi-
nority sub-contractors on federal projects promoted the negative re-
sult of an increase in racism.2 96 While the Court may not care that an
action such as abortion or standard marriage is stigmatized, it does
care when a racial minority is affected. In this way, affirmative action
laws are distinguishable from covenant marriage.
Precedents indicate that Louisiana's creation of covenant marriage
is unlikely to pose an undue burden. Under Casey, then, once the
Court finds that the challenged regulation is not an undue burden on
the asserted right, the statute need only be reasonably related to a
legitimate state interest.297 The state interests asserted by Louisiana
include lasting marriages,29 which is linked to the decrease of numer-
ous social ills said to be exacerbated by divorce, such as poverty and
juvenile crime.299 These are arguably legitimate state interests. In ex-
amining whether a rational relationship exists between covenant mar-
riage laws and discouraging divorce, it is significant that covenant
marriage laws mandate delays before marriage and divorce through
291. Id
292. Id. at 227 (applying strict scrutiny to all racial classifications).
293. See Planned Parenthood v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 877 (1992) (plurality opinion).
294. See id.
295. See id. at 876 (plurality opinion).
296. Adarand, 515 U.S. at 229.
297. Casey, 505 U.S. at 878 (plurality opinion).
298. See Richard Locker, "Covenant" Marriage License Restricting Divorce Gets
Study, Comm. Appeal (Memphis), Oct. 9, 1997, at B1 (reporting that the state legisla-
tor who introduced the covenant marriage bill asserted that the legislation was
designed to make marriages more successful, in part by getting couples to discuss
their commitment to one another prior to the wedding).
299. See supra note 2.
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counseling300 and separation requirements, 30 1 which at the very least
prompt individual reflection-if not a discussion between flanc6s or
spouses-about the decisions to marry or to divorce. This may lead to
postponements or cancellations of marriages of precipitous or previ-
ously unreflective couples and may lead to a better understanding be-
tween those entering promising marriages. In Casey, the Court held
that waiting periods reasonably result in more thoughtful and in-
formed decisions.3 0 Under this analysis, Louisiana's covenant mar-
riage law is rationally related to a legitimate state interest and passes
deferential scrutiny. Accordingly, the measure is constitutional.30 3
By passing a covenant marriage law, the state legislatures are at-
tempting to encourage lasting marriages.30 4 They also hope that the
choice between two marriage options will prompt deliberation and
discussion about commitment and expectations prior to the mar-
riage.30 5 While a Court is unlikely to find that the Louisiana statute
runs afoul of the Constitution,30 6 the question remains whether such
300. See supra note 18 and accompanying text.
301. See supra notes 34-36 and accompanying text.
302. Casey, 505 U.S. at 885 (plurality opinion).
303. If the Court opts to apply intermediate scrutiny to covenant marriage laws, the
Court would likely reach the same conclusion regarding their constitutionality. To
pass intermediate scrutiny, a statute must serve important state interests and be sub-
stantially related to those interests. See supra notes 80-84 and accompanying text.
Encouraging families to stay intact and lowering the divorce rate would likely consti-
tute important state interests. The mandated counseling and delays prior to marriage
and divorce imposed by covenant marriage laws are arguably substantially related to
the state objective under Casey. There, the Court held that delays reasonably en-
courage thoughtful decisions, which could decrease the number of abortions. See
Casey, 505 U.S. at 885 (plurality opinion). This argument can be analogized to di-
vorces so that covenant marriage laws can pass intermediate scrutiny.
304. See, e.g., Lawrence Viele, Marriage Bill Sails in Senate, Fla. Times-Union, Feb.
21, 1998, at B1 (reporting that state senators in Georgia passed a covenant marriage
bill in the hope of strengthening marriage).
305. See, e.g., supra note 298 (reporting that the Louisiana legislator who intro-
duced the covenant marriage bill did so in the hope of promoting discussion among
betrothed couples).
306. Though the analysis in this Note has focused on whether covenant marriage
laws violate the Fourteenth Amendment, as explained below, some opponents of cov-
enant marriage laws have deemed them an unconstitutional joinder between church
and state. See infra notes 327-28 and accompanying text. If opponents of the law
argued in court that covenant marriage violates the Establishment Clause, this argu-
ment would not likely go far as there is evidence that many churches reject covenant
marriage. See id. Even if the evidence supporting this argument were stronger, the
Court is unlikely to overturn any statute based on this linkage. Opponents of the
Hyde Amendment challenged in Harris v. McRae also raised the argument that it
violated the Establishment Clause because "it incorporate[d] into law the doctrines of
the Roman Catholic Church concerning the sinfulness of abortion and the time at
which life commences." Harris v. McRae, 448 U.S. 297, 319 (1980). The Court re-
jected this argument, holding that "it does not follow that a statute violates the Estab-
lishment Clause because it 'happens to coincide or harmonize with the tenets of some
or all religions."' Id. (quoting McGowen v. Maryland, 366 U.S. 420, 442 (1961)).
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laws are prudent, sound, or wise. 307 The problems covenant marriage
laws pose for hypothetical couples A and B trigger various policy is-
sues that weigh against covenant marriage laws. The following section
discusses those concerns.
B. The Policy Debate Surrounding Louisiana's Covenant
Marriage Law
The following is a discussion of the policy arguments both support-
ing and opposing Louisiana's covenant marriage law. As the first of
its kind, Louisiana's two-tier marriage system has garnered a great
deal of attention. Due to the very recent passage of the covenant
marriage law, comments by political commentators and policy makers
make up the bulk of the published views on this legislation.' In ad-
dition, though constitutional theorists have not opined on the consti-
tutionality of covenant marriage specifically, it is possible to analogize
statements such theorists have made in other legal contexts to cove-
nant marriage. The following is a list of three broad political and soci-
etal groups and their possible general responses to the covenant
marriage law.
307. This prompts an inquiry into the distinction between what is constitutional and
what is "good" or "just." Some constitutional theorists believe there is no clear, radi-
cal distinction between what the law is and what the law should be. See William J.
Brennan, Jr., The Constitution of the United States: Contemporary Ratification, 27 S.
Tex. L. Rev. 433 (1986). If the Supreme Court hands down a decision it believes to be
unjust, then they also believe it is unconstitutional. The Constitution's allegiance to
human dignity does not allow for objectively unjust laws to remain constitutional. See
id. These theorists have been accused of interpreting the Constitution in a manner
that advances their own value system. See, e.g., John Hart Ely, Democracy and Dis-
trust: A Theory of Judicial Review 44-48 (1980) (commenting on the problems with
judges using their own values as sources for making judgments). Some tend to read
the constitution literally, not abstractly. See Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479,
510 (1965) (Black, J., dissenting) (stating "I like my privacy as well as the next one,
but I am nevertheless compelled to admit that government has a right to invade it
unless prohibited by some specific constitutional provision"): Antonin Scalia, A Mat-
ter of Interpretation 23-25 (1997) (detailing the author's focus on the constitutional
text itself). These interpreters claim to make no value judgments when applying the
Constitution. If the text says nothing about a particular societal problem, then no
court may utilize the Constitution to right some injustice. Though an unremedied
situation may result in some lasting injury, that does not make it unconstitutional. See
Griswold, 381 U.S. at 510 (Black, J., dissenting).
308. There has been little commentary on the constitutionality of this law. Those
who have written on Louisiana's covenant marriage law, however, have suggested
legal arguments both for and against the law if the statute were to be challenged. See
infra Parts III.A, B, & C.
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1. A Liberal Response
Liberals might argue against the constitutionality of Louisiana's
covenant marriage law.3"9 The label "liberal" traditionally refers to
one who highly values individual autonomy and free choice. 310 Liber-
als believe in individualism and individual freedom, 31  and also be-
lieve that the "government should be neutral among conceptions of
the good life in order to respect the capacity of persons as free citizens
or autonomous agents to choose their conceptions for themselves."3" 2
This neutrality would prompt the government to "leave its citizens as
free as possible to choose their own values and ends," and, hence,
when government prefers one possible avenue over others, this inter-
feres with freedom. 313 Indeed, governmental attempts to define the
good life would likely trigger a worry among liberals that the govern-
ment was abusing its power over an individual. Liberals assert that it
is the individual, and not the community or the government, who
should be the authority on what is "good. '314 When the community's
definition of what is "good" infiltrates politics, it can lead to prejudice
and intolerance.315
Liberals might oppose covenant marriage laws on the grounds that
they interfere with individual free choice.316 While it may seem illogi-
cal to view a statute as anti-choice when it creates two options in lieu
of just one, there are two ways that Louisiana's covenant marriage law
infringes on individual autonomy. First, the government considers
309. But see infra Part III.C for a discussion of pro-responsibility theorists' re-
sponse, which includes some liberals who support certain measures that encourage
responsibility.
310. See Sandel, Moral Argument, supra note 143, at 522.
311. Robin West, Foreword: Taking Freedom Seriously, 104 Harv. L. Rev. 43, 45
(1990) [hereinafter West, Taking Freedom Seriously]. Indeed, Mary Ann Glendon
critiques the liberal dialect for its "homage to independence and self-sufficiency,
based on an image of the rights-bearer as a self-determining, unencumbered individ-
ual." Mary Ann Glendon, Rights Talk 48 (1991) [hereinafter Glendon, Rights Talk].
312. Sandel, Moral Argument, supra note 143, at 522.
313. Michael J. Sandel, Introduction to Liberalism and its Critics 1, 1 (Michael J.
Sandel ed., 1984) [hereinafter Sandel, Introduction].
314. Robin West, Progressive and Conservative Constitutionalism, 88 Mich. L. Rev.
641, 663 (1990) [hereinafter West, Constitutionalism]; see Michael J. Sandel, The Con-
stitution of the Procedural Republic: Liberal Rights and Civic Virtues, 66 Fordham L.
Rev. 1, 2 (1997).
315. Sandel, Introduction, supra note 313, at 7; see Ronald Dworkin, Liberalism, in
Liberalism and its Critics, supra note 313, at 60, 64 (stating that the "first theory of
equality supposes that political decisions must be, so far as is possible, independent of
any particular conception of the good life, or of what gives value to life").
316. Peter D. Kramer, Divorce and Our National Vahtes, N.Y. Times, Aug. 29, 1997,
at A23. Barbara Dafoe Whitehead, the author of The Divorce Culture, has written on
the concept of "expressive divorce," which is the notion that divorce has become an
instrument for personal growth. Barbara Dafoe Whitehead, The Divorce Culture 45-
65 (1997). Along with this development, according to Whitehead, came a change in
divorce; it became an individual event with a lack of concern for its impact on others.
Id. at 54.
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covenant marriage the more committed marriage, as indicated by the
mandatory declaration that all who enter a covenant marriage must
attest.317 Because the government has created such a marriage, indi-
viduals may feel that they must choose this marriage type.-" This re-
sults in a marital relationship that is less than truly voluntary.319 The
law influences how people behave, and individuals perceive other
people and institutions based on how their government views them.'20
This influence may rise to the level of coercion. 2'
A second way that covenant marriage laws limit a person's auton-
omy is by creating inadequate options from which an individual must
choose to get married. Louisiana's covenant marriage law creates a
choice between a devalued regular marriage and a sacred marriage
that is very difficult to dissolve should things go awry. 3  Both are
unattractive options. "[T]o be autonomous, a person must not only be
given a choice but he must be given an adequate range of choices,"'323
and, arguably, covenant marriages laws do not provide this.
Some liberals might also disapprove of covenant marriage because
the state defines what is "best.' 324 By passing this law, the commu-
nity, via the legislature, is defining what is best-lasting marriages and
317. See La. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 9:273(A)(1) (West Supp. 1998) which includes:
[M]arriage is a covenant between a man and a woman who agree to live
together as husband and wife for so long as they both may live.... [W]e
understand that a Covenant Marriage is for life.... We promise to love,
honor, and care for one another ... for the rest of our lives.
318. Kramer, supra note 316. This argument is weakened by the fact that there are
two people entering into this decision. If either party is feeling swayed into selecting
the covenant marriage option by its mere availability, the requirement that the other
party agree as well makes it less of a conflict between the state and an individual.
319. Id.
320. See Peter J. Riga, Marriage and Family Law: Historical, Constitutional, and
Practical Perspectives 76 (1986) (stating that "[tihe educative force of law in Ameri-
can society is so strong that people tend to draw moral conclusions for practical living
from it"); Scott, supra note 3, at 12 (asserting that "(alt least at some intangible level,
the law itself, in the way it portrays marriage and in its reinforcement of social norms,
influences what people perceive the marital relationship to be"); William A. Galston,
Making Divorce Harder is Better, Wash. Post, Aug. 10, 1997, at C3 [hereinafter Gal-
ston, Making Divorce Harder] ("[Olver time law can help change culture .... It is
amazing how many people who believe (rightly) that civil rights laws helped change
racial attitudes deny that any such consequences can flow from changes in the laws of
marriage and divorce.").
321. See Pollitt, supra note 12; cf. Dworkin. Life's Dominion, supra note 143, at
154-59 (acknowledging the validity of governmental coercion in certain areas of life
but not others).
322. Lynne Z. Gold-Bikin, Let's Eliminate lte Idea of Covenant Marriage, Chi.
Trib., Sept. 7, 1997, § 13, at 9 (stating that Louisiana has "cheapenied] marriage by
suggesting that you and I were not serious when we exchanged our vows and that ...
Louisiana knows how to provide a real marriage").
323. Joseph Raz, The Morality of Freedom 373-74 (1986) (explaining how a person
who has only trivial options or only potentially deplorable options has completely
inadequate choices and does not have an autonomous life).
324. See supra notes 310, 314 and accompanying text.
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two-parent families-and imposing this definition on individuals. 25
This interferes with our nation's traditions, which value autonomy in
decision-making, self-expression, and self-reliance.326
The American Civil Liberties Union ("ACLU") takes another lib-
eral view, arguing that covenant marriage laws are an impermissible
joinder of church and state insofar as the legislation incorporates
Christian values into law.327 The ACLU asserts that the term "cove-
nant" has biblical connotations and promotes marriages found in the
Bible, complete with a dominant husband and submissive wife. 328 In-
deed, the original legislation was proposed by a Promise Keeper,32'
and graduate of Liberty University. 33 ° In addition, leaders of certain
faiths in Louisiana have encouraged covenant over standard mar-
riages, with some having announced plans to refuse to hold non-cove-
nant marriages in their churches or to preside over standard marriages
if held elsewhere.331
2. A Feminist Response
Feminists are divided on the issue of covenant marriage, with sup-
porters and detractors both claiming that their view best advances wo-
325. Pollitt, supra note 12.
326. Kramer, supra note 316 (asserting that divorce is often a positive thing and is
in synch with Americans' independent nature). It is arguable, however, that commit-
ment to family is also a part of our nation's history. See Blankenhorn, supra note 2, at
1-62 (studying the recent increases in and problems of one-parent families and en-
couraging the return to two-parent families).
327. See Duren Cheek, "Covenant Marriage" May Soon Be Option, The Tennes-
sean, Oct. 9, 1997, at Al.
328. See Pollitt, supra note 12 (stating that a covenant marriage "means a marriage
that mirrors what fundamentalists see as the relation between Christ and Humanity,
with a loving husband as Lord ruling an obedient wife along lines set down in the
Bible").
329. Cheryl Wetzstein, Legislative Pioneer Credits Power of Prayer, Wash. Times,
Oct. 9, 1997, at A2. The Promise Keepers is a men's Christian group which "urges
men to take their biblically defined role as the ultimate heads of the household." Scott
Bowles, Promise Keeper's Troubled Past, USA Today, Oct. 30, 1997, at A3.
330. Wetzstein, supra note 329. The former televangelist, Jerry Falwell, founded
Liberty University. J.A. Adande, When Giving Thanks Draws a Penalty, Wash. Post,
Sept. 1, 1995, at Al.
331. Bruce Nolan, Churches Weighing "Covenant Marriage," Times-Picayune (New
Orleans), June 25, 1997, at Al (reporting that, Episcopalian leaders plan to wed only
couples with covenant marriage licenses). These circumstances can be viewed as evi-
dence that the law joins church and state. See Pollitt, supra note 12. But see Catholic
Bishops to Bless Either Form of Civil Marriage in Louisiana, Baton Rouge Advocate,
Oct. 31, 1997, at B12 (reporting that unlike Southern Baptist leaders, Catholic, Jewish,
and Methodist leaders do not support covenant marriage, though all agree the legisla-
tion's focus on families is "commendable"). Catholic leaders will not endorse Louisi-
ana's covenant marriage law because it requires priests to explain the law's divorce
requirements and the Church does not allow divorce. See Nolan, supra. Some church
leaders do not support the law based on their beliefs that every marriage is a cove-
nant. Julie Kay, Covenant Couples Few, Baton Rouge Advocate, Oct. 25, 1997, at Cl.
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men's interests.332 Feminists are largely split between those who
support the notion that Louisiana's law protects women who tend to
be abandoned by self-indulgent husbands,33 and those who find that
the legislation's efforts to protect women from divorce demeaning, or
worse, dangerous.3 4
Some feminists who support the covenant marriage movement are
likely to disagree with the liberal emphasis on autonomy.3 35 These
feminist legal scholars have asserted that an emphasis on autonomy
hurts women because women often lack self-autonomy due to cultural
restraints.336 Supporters of this view may see covenant marriage laws
as a necessary check on the only true autonomous individuals in a
marriage: husbands.337 Louisiana's new law helps women because it
restores power to the innocent spouse, and it is typically the woman
who has the legal power to file for a fault-based divorce.3 s Women
332. Compare Katherine Shaw Spaht, Would Louisiana's "Covenant Marriage" Be
a Good Idea for America?: Yes, Insight, Oct. 6, 1997, at 24 (praising covenant mar-
riages and their potential effects on the high divorce rate), with Applewhite, supra
note 68, at 25 (doubting that covenant marriage will impact the divorce rate and as-
serting that the law will affect families and women negatively).
333. See Spaht, supra note 332.
334. See Catharine A. MacKinnon, Toward a Feminist Theory of the State 61
(1989) (stating that "[fleminist theory sees the family as a unit of male dominance, a
locale of male violence and reproductive exploitation"); Linda J. Lacey, Mandatory
Marriage "For the Sake of tre Children": A Feminist Reply to Elizabeth Scott, 66 Tul.
L. Rev. 1435, 1450 (1992) (asserting that proposals to prevent divorce "would not
significantly deter the husband and would have the unintended effect of injuring the
wife and children").
335. See Tracy E. Higgins, Democracy and Feminism, 110 Harv. L Rev. 1657, 1666
(1997) (describing the weaknesses of the liberal emphasis on autonomy).
336. See id. at 1696-97 (arguing that liberal constitutionalism ignores the cultural
restraints that limit women in their democratic participation); Robin West, Recon-
structing Liberty, 59 Tenn. L. Rev. 441, 453-61 (1992) [hereinafter Vest, Reconstruct-
ing] (describing the inequality in the labor force, women's fear of sexual violence, and
the general vulnerability of women).
337. See Lacey, supra note 334, at 1448 (asserting that men "are permitted by our
system to make basic choices about their identity from birth, while many women are
denied this option until they are mature enough to create their own choices").
Just as there is disagreement over whether covenant marriage is good for women,
there is an analogous debate over whether no-fault divorce has been good for women.
One of the initiatives the women's movement promoted was the passage of no-fault
divorce laws. See Susan Faludi, Backlash: The Undeclared War Against American
Women 315 (1991). This effort was later criticized. See Weitzman, supra note 3.
Weitzman claimed, for one, that divorced women experience a seventy-three percent
decline in their standard of living in the first post-divorce year. Id. at 338. Weitzman's
research methods, however, have been criticized as flawed. Faludi, supra, at 20-25.
Some research shows that it is actually men who are worse off after divorce. Id. at 25-
26 (citing studies that men suffer from depression and other health problems post-
divorce and are reportedly more devastated and less happy after a break-up than
women).
338. Spaht, supra note 332. On a related note, fault-based divorce can be seen as
an advantage for women when negotiating separation agreements with men who want
a quick divorce. See Weitzman, supra note 3. at 28-31; see also Milton C. Regan, Jr.,
Family Law and the Pursuit of Intimacy 139 (1993) (stating that under a no-fault re-
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sacrifice more when they assume that the relationship is for life be-
cause they are more likely to forgo pursuit of a career upon marriage
and motherhood.339 Consequently, measures that encourage longer
marriages protect women to a greater extent.340 Men, having been
raised to pursue self-fulfillment, are too comfortable with abandoning
a family.341 Covenant marriage can discourage this impulse by man-
dating longer separation periods and counseling.
The concept that women lack autonomy, and therefore need the
protection of covenant marriage laws, can also be used to condemn
such laws. A woman who is not truly independent-minded is more
likely to find herself in an abusive or unhappy marriage. 42 Thus, cov-
enant marriage may pose dangers to women, because covenant mar-
riage's stricter divorce requirements may restrict a woman's ability to
escape an abusive husband.343 Covenant marriage laws fail to address
"the potential for oppression between the individual and other forms
of organized social authority," such as the family.344
A second feminist critique of covenant marriage would not reject,
but rather champion, autonomy arguments. This view finds assump-
tions that women welcome protection from divorce sexist because
they assume that men are both the wage earners and the ones who
want out of a marriage.3 45 These feminists argue that women are gen-
erally not helpless; indeed, women are the ones who file for the major-
ity of divorces.346 No-fault divorce laws came to fruition as women
gained in political power for a reason-because women wanted and
gime, one may see "a higher incidence of opportunistic behavior, because that behav-
ior will not be penalized in a divorce proceeding").
339. Spaht, supra note 332.
340. See id.
341. See Blankenhorn, supra note 2, at 4 (stating that the fact that America is "fa-
therless" is due in part to a "me-first egoism" among men that serves only the most
"puerile understanding of personal happiness").
342. See Barbara Dafoe Whitehead, The Divorce Trap, N.Y. Times, Jan. 13, 1997, at
A17. If feminist theorists who claim that women lack autonomy are correct, see supra
note 336, that may account for the number of women in abusive relationships. See
Eve S. Buzawa & Carl G. Buzawa, Domestic Violence: The Criminal Justice Re-
sponse 8 (2d ed. 1996) (reporting statistics on domestic violence, including the Na-
tional Criminal Victimization Survey that estimates 50% of American couples have
experienced at least one incident of assault, and that in over 90% of those incidents,
the victim was female). See generally Lacey, supra note 334, at 1443-46. (explaining
the need for a prompt divorce when a woman is abused).
343. Lacey, supra note 334, at 1443-46. This idea is further linked to the notion that
the liberal state crafts its laws in favor of men. See MacKinnon, supra note 334, at 162
(stating that the "liberal state coercively and authoritatively constitutes the social or-
der in the interest of men as a gender . . . [and] the state's formal norms recapitulate
the male point of view on the level of design").
344. West, Reconstructing Liberty, supra note 336, at 449.
345. Applewhite, supra note 68.
346. Faludi, supra note 337, at 26; Lacey, supra note 334, at 1449 (citations
omitted).
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needed these laws.347 For these reasons, divorce should remain easily
obtainable by women. Covenant marriage, however, makes divorce
less accessible on account of its limited allowance of fault-based di-
vorce' and lengthy separation requirements for no-fault divorce. - 9
3. A "Pro-Responsibilities" Response
A person who is "pro-responsibilities" is one who, in contrast to
rights-oriented liberals, may desire the protection of rights against
state encroachment, but also wants the state to encourage individuals
to exercise their rights responsibly.350 Prominent figures in political
and constitutional discourse from different backgrounds might be
characterized as pro-responsibility. They include conservative,-5' lib-
eral,352 and progressive 35 3 theorists. Each has different conceptions of
347. See Herma Hill Kay, Beyond No-Fault, in Divorce Reform at the Crossroads,
supra note 4, at 6, 6 (stating that, between the years 1969 and 1985, all fifty states
adopted some form of no-fault divorce); Applewhite. supra note 68 (reporting that
"advancements in women's social and political status correlate with access to afforda-
ble divorce").
348. See La. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 9:307 (West Supp. 1998).
349. ld.
350. See Linda C. McClain, Rights and Irresponsibility, 43 Duke ". 989, 998-1013
(1994). Robin West has argued that a "robust respect for rights is not only a neces-
sary condition for individual liberty... but is also a condition for the exercise of
individual responsibility, without which freedom is either inconsequential or morally
unpalatable." West, Taking Freedom Seriously, supra note 311, at 79.
351. One example is the conservative Mary Ann Glendon, who has criticized Ron-
ald Dworkin's notion of the American "lone-rights bearer," described in Ronald
Dworkin, Taking Rights Seriously (1977) [hereinafter Dworkin, Taking Rights Seri-
ously], who is connected to others and society only by choice. Glendon, Rights Talk,
supra note 311, at 47-48. Glendon argues that other countries, where the individual is
recognized, as well as individual responsibility to the community, have a moral fabric
superior to America. Id. at 61-66. She finds that European countries have more of a
balance between the individual and society and notes that this interconnection can
greatly benefit individuals instead of creating an imposition. Id. Though Glendon has
not written specifically on covenant marriage, for over a decade she has been an advo-
cate of making divorce more difficult. See Mary Ann Glendon. Family Law Reforms
in the 1980's, 44 La. L. Rev. 1553, 1563 (1984).
352. See William A. Galston, Liberal Purposes (1991). Rather than curtailing inde-
pendence, Galston asserts that government's active involvement in fostering virtue
will create enriched freedom. Id. at 6. By advocating a strong work ethic and delayed
gratification, government can strengthen families and community. See id. at 223. Soci-
ety is in dire need of citizens possessing these attributes, according to Galston. be-
cause an emphasis on freedom for freedom's sake has contributed to a variety of
social ills, including the breakdown of the two-parent family. Id.
Even Ronald Dworkin, a proponent of "taking rights seriously," see Dworkin, Tak-
ing Rights Seriously, supra note 351, at 184-205, has tentatively supported the role of
government in promoting responsibility. See Dworkin, Life's Dominion, supra note
143, at 150-51. Originally, the responsibility argument urged by Glendon was in re-
sponse to those like Dworkin who zealously focused on the importance of taking indi-
vidual rights seriously. Glendon's criticisms of America's focus on individual rights is
in part a jab at Dworkin's celebration of individual rights. See Glendon, Rights Talk,
supra note 311, at 47-66. More recently, Dworkin has also supported government
attempts to promote responsibility and reflection. See Dworkin Life's Dominion,
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what is responsible behavior and distinct reasons for supporting meas-
ures aimed at that behavior. For example, when defining responsible
behavior, conservatives tend to welcome private groups setting nor-
mative standards of what is responsible behavior, with the govern-
ment implementing the standards the groups set.354 Liberals and
progressives prefer the government to set social norms without influ-
ence from private groups who may want to further an "illegitimate
private hierarchy." '355 Despite their differences, pro-responsibility ad-
vocates share a belief that government may seek to encourage people
to exercise their rights responsibly through lawmaking.
Pro-responsibility types are likely to endorse covenant marriage
laws.356 They see such laws as helping "restore balance and fairness to
a system which at present gives little weight to important individual
supra note 143, at 150-51. Arguably, Dworkin did not have much choice in the mat-
ter, for Dworkin's strategy of protecting rights "depends upon the judiciary's willing-
ness, and not just its ability, to enforce the moral principles that determine those
rights." West, Taking Freedom Seriously, supra note 311, at 59 (emphasis omitted).
The Supreme Court has not cooperated with Dworkin's view of the role of the judici-
ary, and he has moved toward the pro-responsibility side, albeit only to a limited
degree. See Dworkin, Life's Dominion, supra note 143, at 151-59.
353. Progressives include, for example, Cass Sunstein, see Sunstein, supra note 249,
and Robin West, see West, Constitutionalism, supra note 314. Progressives support
government's authority to shape responsible citizens; progressives encourage such
"shaping" measures rather than fretting over the potential for undue governmental
influence. See id. West agrees that Dworkin's emphasis on individual rights fails to
protect liberty without judicial cooperation. West, Taking Rights Seriously, supra note
311, at 79. West has reported that individualism is "under attack" by the Supreme
Court and freedom is no longer being protected. Id. at 45. Instead, the Court is grant-
ing more leeway to state measures at the expense of the individual. Id. at 43-44. West
faults Dworkin's and other liberals' tendencies to insulate the individual from public
scrutiny when exercising the individual's rights, which leaves people and their rights
vulnerable. Id. at 71. By insulating the individual, it is impossible for others to under-
stand why the rights should be protected. Id. Because individual rights are no longer
ardently protected by the Court, West believes that "the people rather than the courts
are to be charged with the duty of protecting freedom." Id. at 79. Hence, West fo-
cuses on responsibility so that Americans who must be charged with protecting indi-
vidual rights-as opposed to courts being so charged-will agree to take up that role.
Id. This argument follows the notion that voters must be able to sympathize with
others so that they will protect rights that they themselves may not need or want. See
id. If the general community learns how and why rights are exercised, and under-
stands that they are exercised responsibly, then voters will protect rights for all indi-
viduals. See id.
354. West, Constitutionalism, supra note 314, at 643.
355. Id. West writes that while liberals place authority in the individual when defin-
ing what is good, and conservatives look to the community, progressives encourage
legislatures to define norms based on how the "relatively disempowered," or those
who are low in the "social hierarchy," define what is good. Id. at 662, 679 (emphasis
omitted).
356. See Glendon, Rights Talk, supra note 311; Mary Ann Glendon, Abortion and
Divorce in Western Law 113-24, 131-38 (1987). See Galston, Making Divorce Harder,
supra note 320. Mary Ann Glendon has long argued that the emphasis on individual-
ism in America has destroyed its families.
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and social interests in strengthening marriage. ' 3-7 The creation of a
choice in marriage "provides a model of how a state can foster what it
considers a virtue-in this case, stronger marriages-by giving people
the opportunity to be virtuous, but not penalizing them if they choose
not to."3
58
The groups listed above offer constitutional and policy arguments
on behalf of and in opposition to covenant marriage laws. Some of
these notions are directly applicable to the hypothetical plaintiffs from
the constitutional analysis. The following section analyzes these
arguments.
D. Policy Arguments Against Covenant Marriage as Applied to the
Hypothetical Plaintiffs
Couple A objected to the limits covenant marriage places on their
ability to divorce. Though there is no constitutional right to di-
vorce,359 arguably it is sound policy for the state not to delay divorce
once a couple has decided to obtain one. This would be true even
where a couple has chosen to follow more restrictive divorce laws.
Individuals planning a wedding rarely believe that they will get di-
vorced.360 Once an individual realizes that, contrary to one's original
beliefs, divorce is inevitable, there are sound reasons why the state's
granting of the divorce should not be delayed. For one, lengthy state-
imposed separations interfere with an individual's freedom to live
one's life as one sees fit.361 More specifically, delaying divorce may
harm the entire family unit. Although studies have shown that di-
vorce results in emotional and financial harm to children, ' 2 "witness-
ing or being party to parental conflict is what harms children," and
"covenant marriage ensures prolonged exposure to children to the
most damaging possible circumstances: parents who fight. 3 - '3 It is
unclear whether the majority of Americans support efforts like cove-
nant marriage to encourage people to stay married, for -[e]veryone is
against divorce in the abstract, but in the concrete, they understand
why particular people they know had to have a divorce."' Such be-
liefs likely account for recent poll results indicating that fifty-nine per-
357. Galston, Making Divorce Harder, supra note 320.
358. Etzioni, supra note 12.
359. See supra note 93 and accompanying text.
360. See Trafford, supra note 12 (reporting that those getting married believe that
their marriage will last); see also Margaret Carlson, 7711 Depositions Do Us Part, Time,
July 7, 1997, at 21 (describing the "hopefulness" of engaged couples, making them
unlikely to expect divorce and more likely to choose covenant marriage).
361. See supra notes 312-13 and accompanying text.
362. See supra note 2 and accompanying text.
363. Applewhite, supra note 68; see Whitehead, supra note 342 (stating -[nJothing
is more emotionally devastating to children than a prolonged conflict among their
parents").
364. Kim, supra note 12.
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cent of Americans said that the government should not make it harder
for people to get a divorce.365
Both Couple A and Couple B objected to government encourage-
ment of responsible behavior-namely choosing covenant marriage in
the hope of staying married rather than getting a divorce. Couple A
felt coerced by the government into choosing covenant marriage be-
cause their government preferred it over standard marriage. Though
all laws influence or coerce an individual to adopt some mode of be-
havior, such as paying taxes or protecting endangered species, such
laws do not affect one's life in the same way as laws involving mar-
riage do. 366 Americans have a history of resenting government efforts
to guide their personal lives.367
Couple B, meanwhile, was dissuaded from marrying altogether be-
cause they felt that the government's preference for covenant mar-
riage placed a stigma on standard marriage. By creating two types of
marriage, Louisiana has, in the process, lessened the commitment in-
volved in a standard marriage.368 This is a questionable way of bol-
stering marriage generally. Instead, states should keep "standard"
marriage as the only option and find different ways to discourage
divorce.369
Another policy argument weighing against covenant marriage laws
is the potential for women to be coerced by their fianc6s to choose
covenant marriage. Women are more likely than men to be pressured
365. Id. (reporting results of a Time/CNN Poll conducted May 7-8, 1997).
366. Cf Dworkin, Life's Dominion, supra note 143, at 154-55 (making the same
comparison to abortion laws).
367. See Frank Bruni, Self-Help Credo: I'm O.K., You're Not, N.Y. Times, Aug. 31,
1997, § 4, at 10 (asserting that "Americans feel one way about didacticism that has the
muscle of law," such as no smoking laws, "and another way about didacticism that has
no authority and spawns recommendations," such as how-to and self-help books by
private figures).
368. See Ellen Goodman, On the Highway of Love, Louisiana Will Road-Test Mar-
riage Choices: Regular or High-Test, Boston Globe, Aug. 10, 1997, at D7 (questioning
how the institution of marriage is bolstered by creating different classes of marriage,
asserting that "regular" marriage has been downgraded by the creation of "a pre-
mium product"); Clarence Page, Editorial, Happily Ever After?: Fix Marriages
Before They Start, Chi. Trib., Aug. 20, 1997, § 1, at 19 (asserting that covenant mar-
riage "implies that any other kind of marriage is somehow cheap and flighty").
369. It is worthwhile to compare covenant marriage to other innovations designed
to lower the divorce rate. Most suggestions aim to change behavior prior to when the
marriage takes place. One locally-based effort that is growing in popularity is the
concept of "Community Marriage." Hara Estroff Marano, Rescuing Marriages Before
They Begin, N.Y. Times, May 28, 1997, at C9. These policies are in effect in over fifty
cities and require clergy and judges to require couples they marry to have premarital
counseling. Id. Another private effort involves pairing newlyweds with older married
couples who serve as mentors. William Raspberry, Marriage Mentors, Wash. Post, Jan.
12, 1996, at A15. One legislative effort, proposed by a Michigan State Representative,
makes couples who have not received premarital counseling wait longer to receive
marriage licenses than those who have. H.B. 4631, 89th Leg., Reg. Sess. (Mich. 1997).
These efforts lack the attributes of covenant marriage that many take issue with: the
denigration of standard marriage by creating a higher grade of marriage.
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into such a decision because they can lack autonomy.3 70 The Court
has acknowledged the widespread incidence of battering of women by
their husbands and boyfriends.37 1 Women paired with an abusive fi-
anc6 likely would be intimidated into a covenant marriage, and this is
just the type of marriage that should be easiest to dissolve." 2
These policy concerns intimate that covenant marriage laws may
damage individuals as well as the institution of marriage. While cove-
nant marriage laws are constitutional, this does not make them a posi-
tive contribution to society or an effective way to lower divorce rates
and its concomitant social ills.
CONCLUSION
Though likely constitutional, covenant marriage laws pose a
number of problems. Louisiana has proposed a way to encourage
lasting marriages, but the state's method may be ineffective or other-
wise undesirable. The response to covenant marriages in the only
state where they are available, Louisiana, has been underwhelming 373
and this reaction may be due to individuals' resentment of this statute.
The unenthusiastic response, however, may not necessarily be due to
some statement of rejection of the law, but may simply demonstrate
that such a law is ineffective in practice. If this is the case, there is a
possibility that state governments may step up their encouragement of
lasting marriages, and enact a different, more intrusive law designed
to discourage divorce. For example, a law could go further by subject-
ing marriage license applicants to a state official's questions regarding
their commitment. It is a legitimate concern that a state will try to go
too far to foster a specific virtue.374 If the number of divorces does
not decrease in a covenant marriage state, the question remains
whether future legislation will abandon virtue encouragement as inef-
fective or step up the coercion level, thereby compromising individual
citizens' autonomy.
Whether one finds that Louisiana's covenant marriage law has a co-
ercive effect, is totally ineffective, or somewhere in between, the
370. See supra note 336 and accompanying text.
371. See supra notes 226-27.
372. See Bill to End No-Fault Divorce in Florida Would Make It Harder to Break
Up, N.Y. Tumes, Dec. 29, 1996, § 1, at 19 (providing an example of a battered woman
benefiting from Florida's no-fault divorce option and fearing the effects of the no-
fault divorce law's repeal).
373. See Zganjar, supra note 263 (reporting how only one percent of couples get-
ting married have chosen covenant marriages after six months). This works against
opponents' arguments that the law coerces people into choosing the covenant option,
but it could be that citizens are sending a message that they resent the government's
"suggesting" what kind of marriage is preferable. Given that the law has only been in
effect since July 15, 1997, see H.B. 756, 1997 Reg. Sess. (La. 1997) (listing date of
enactment), it is too early to determine what is behind the fact that people are not
choosing covenant marriage means.
374. See Sunstein, supra note 249, at 965.
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above analysis demonstrates that it is very likely to survive any consti-
tutional challenge. If governmental efforts to encourage responsibil-
ity, like the covenant marriage law, are upheld by the Court, perhaps
similar legislation more directly infringing on the right to marry would
be overturned. Those displeased with the potential for infringement
on the right to marry posed by covenant marriage measures should
closely review pending legislation. The pro-responsibilities fervor
should not diminish one's constitutional right to expect autonomy in
personal decisionmaking concerning such fundamental matters as
marriage.
